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BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS
Katherine R. Kruse ∗
In the world of legal ethics, clients are most often constructed
as cardboard figures interested solely in maximizing their own wealth
or freedom at the expense of others. 1 Scour any professional
responsibility textbook, and you will find examples of the ethical
issues that arise when the pursuit of a client’s interests requires a
lawyer to harm innocent third parties, undermine the truth-seeking
norms of the legal system, or both. The proliferation of these
examples is no accident. Rather, it is a consequence of a choice by
early legal ethicists to focus on the dilemma faced by a lawyer forced
by professional duty to do something that would otherwise be wrong.
To generate this kind of dilemma, legal ethicists had to posit
hypothetical clients impervious to ordinary moral considerations,
unconcerned with preserving their relationships with others and
indifferent to their reputations in the community.
This Article argues that the reliance on cardboard clients has
disserved legal ethics by obscuring important issues of professional
responsibility that cannot be examined in the simplified world of the
standard professional responsibility hypothetical. Most notably, the
reliance on cardboard clients has disabled legal ethicists from
confronting a problem I call legal objectification. Legal objectification
is the tendency of lawyers to view their clients as walking bundles of
legal rights and interests rather than as whole persons whose legal
issues often come deeply intertwined with other concerns—
relationships, loyalties, hopes, uncertainties, fears, doubts, and
values—that shape the objectives they bring to legal representation.
The classic example of Spaulding v. Zimmerman is a case in
point. 2 In Spaulding, a personal injury defense lawyer learned from
his own medical expert that the plaintiff had suffered a heart aneurysm
probably caused by the automobile accident at issue in the case. 3 The
∗

Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las
Vegas. I would like to thank the following persons for facilitating invaluable
discussion of these ideas and feedback on earlier drafts this article: Susan Carle,
David Luban, Rob Rubinson, and Ted Schneyer. This article benefited greatly from
presentation at the Law Speakers’ Series at American University, Washington
College of Law, the Clinical Research Forum at William S. Boyd School of Law,
and the Potomac Valley Writer’s Workshop.
1
See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1731, 1737 (1993); Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical DecisionMaking and the Methodology of Law, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1185 (2001).
2
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
3
Id. at 707.
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defense lawyer proceeded to settle the case without ever revealing to
the plaintiff that his life was in danger. The court re-opened the
settlement two years later when the aneurysm was discovered in a
routine medical examination. 4 However, the court was careful to note
that “no canon of ethics or legal obligation” had required the defense
lawyer to inform the plaintiff of the life-threatening medical
condition. 5
For almost thirty years, legal ethicists have used the dramatic
facts of Spaulding to discuss the boundaries of a lawyer’s competing
moral and professional duties when divulging confidential information
could save a human life. 6 However, to use Spaulding to explore this
moral and ethical dilemma, one must imagine a client who will not
consent to disclose the confidential information. Lawyers are always
ethically permitted to reveal confidential information if the client
consents after consultation. 7 If the client in Spaulding were to consent
to reveal the information—perhaps because the client shares the
lawyer’s concern for the value of human life—the lawyer’s dilemma
would disappear.
When the facts behind Spaulding are probed more deeply, it
appears quite likely that the client would have consented to reveal the
potentially life-saving information—that is, if his lawyer had consulted
him. 8 The litigation in Spaulding arose from a car accident in the mid1950s involving three families living in the same rural area of
Minnesota. 9 The action was brought on behalf of 20-year-old David
Spaulding, a passenger in the car driven by 19-year-old John
Zimmerman. 10 When the accident occurred, Zimmerman had been
4

Id. at 709.
Id. at 710.
6
See Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its
Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 65-66, 72
(1998). For many years, the public policy exception to permit disclosure to prevent
harm to others was conditioned on “prevent[ing] the client from committing a
criminal act that was reasonably certain to cause imminent death or substantial
bodily harm.” MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (emphasis added). The
most recent amendments to the ABA Model Rules omit the requirement that one’s
client be criminally culpable and permit disclosure “to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm” regardless of whether the threat to life or bodily
security arises from a criminal act. MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(1) (2002).
7
MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(a) (2002) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).”) (emphasis added).
8
Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 94.
9
Id. at 63-64.
10
Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d, at 706-07.
5
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transporting Spaulding and other employees of his father’s road
construction business home from a worksite at dusk. Their car
collided with a car occupied by the Ledermann family on their way to
the county fair. 11 The accident was a tragic event for all three
families. In addition to seriously injuring David Spaulding, the
accident killed 12-year-old Elaine Ledermann, who was thrown from
her car; killed John Zimmerman’s brother James, also a passenger in
his car; and broke the neck of John Zimmerman’s father, Edward. 12
Given the close relationship between John Zimmerman and David
Spaulding and the devastating loss his own family had already
suffered, it is likely that Zimmerman would have consented—even
wanted—to reveal medical information critically important to
Spaulding’s health and life. 13
The more interesting moral and ethical question revealed by
the facts in Spaulding is why a lawyer would make the decision not to
reveal the confidential information without consulting his client. One
likely answer is that the lawyer in Spaulding saw it as his job simply to
maximize his client’s legal and financial interests and did not consider
the effect of the settlement on the client’s other values or
relationships. 14 In other words, the lawyer in Spaulding may have
been guilty of legally objectifying his client—of viewing John
Zimmerman narrowly as nothing more than a collection of legal and
financial interests disconnected from the rest of his life.
Legal ethicists have not generally explored the problem of
legal objectification revealed in Spaulding, nor could they. To create
the dilemma legal ethicists wanted to discuss, John Zimmerman had to
be constructed as a cardboard figure interested only in maximizing his
legal interests and therefore unwilling to reveal confidential
information that might increase the damages for which he was liable.
Once Zimmerman is constructed as a cardboard figure, it is no longer
possible to see—much less to confront—the problem of legal
objectification also raised by the case. And, this kind of oversight will
always occur when legal ethicists rely on cardboard clients, because
cardboard clients are constructed in theory from the very same
narrowing assumptions that plague the problem of legal objectification
in practice.
11

Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 63.
Id. at 64.
13
See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 6, at 94. The authors based this conclusion in
part on interviews with surviving members of the Zimmerman and Ledermann
families. Id. at 91-92.
14
Id. at 94-96.
12
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The construction of cardboard clients in legal ethics has other
theoretical costs. Relying on the image of cardboard clients, legal
ethicists have exaggerated the problem of over-zealous partisanship
and proposed solutions that distort the balance between lawyers’
professional obligations to clients and to the public. The alternative
professional ideal most commonly proposed by legal ethicists—
sometimes called the “lawyer-statesman model”—exhorts lawyers to
conform their clients’ projects to the public good even if that means
manipulating or betraying their clients in the process. 15
Yet,
reasonable persons often disagree about the content and application of
moral standards. Lawyers who judge their clients’ projects based on
moral standards that the clients do not share can become guilty of
moral overreaching. And, the image of the moral lawyer responsible
for enforcing the public good enables a systemic denial of the reality—
glaringly obvious to non-lawyer observers—that lawyers often pursue
their own self-interest at the expense of their clients. 16
This Article seeks to move legal ethics beyond cardboard
clients by re-imagining how the ideals of professionalism could have
developed if legal ethicists had diagnosed the problem of legal
objectification and sought to cure it. Part I examines the theoretical
history of legal ethics at the time of its post-Watergate fluorescence,
showing how the assumptions of moral lawyers and cardboard clients
arose from the way legal ethicists initially framed the interesting issues
in legal ethics as conflicts between ordinary morality and role
morality. Part II re-examines the theoretical history of legal ethics to
reveal an early interest in the problem of legal objectification that was
never fully explored, and shows how contemporaneous movements in
legal interviewing and counseling literature implicitly addressed the
problem of legal objectification. Part III proposes a model of
partisanship for three-dimensional clients that brings these divergent
strands together and places fidelity to client values at the center of a
lawyer’s partisan duties. Part IV examines the limitations of the client
valued-based model of representation proposed in Part III in the
contexts of representing diminished capacity clients, representing
organizational clients, and pursuing cause lawyering where
mobilization around collective values is necessary to fight systemic
injustice.

15
16

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.E.
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I.

MORAL LAWYERS AND CARDBOARD CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS

Theoretical interest in legal ethics began in the mid-1970s, and
it was a propitious time for theoretical development in the field.
Monroe Freedman was in the midst of a searing campaign to unseat
the orthodoxy and hypocrisy of professional self-regulation. 17 The
American Bar Association (ABA) had adopted a law school
accreditation standard that required instruction in professional
responsibility. 18 And, the legal profession was itself undergoing
intense self-scrutiny. The ABA was beginning an open, public, and at
times hotly-contested process of re-writing the standards that govern
professional regulation into the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 19 The Kutak Commission, which took on the task of drafting
the Model Rules, was conscious of the need to rehabilitate the public
image of lawyers and deliberately solicitous of academic critique as a
source of guidance in the early stages of its rule-making process. 20
The initial foray by moral philosophers into legal ethics came
with philosopher Richard Wasserstrom’s 1975 essay Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues. 21 In the decade or so that followed,
a host of moral philosophers and legal scholars would weigh in on the
theoretical questions of how to justify lawyers’ professional
behavior. 22 Looking back on the earliest moral philosophical essays in
17

Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469, n.1 (1966);
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM vii-viii
(1975). See also William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About Legal Ethics,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (describing the impact of Freedman’s work).
18
David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for
Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452-53 (1981); David Luban, Reason and Passion
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 878-79 (1999).
19
In 1969, the American Bar Association replaced the 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics with the Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1977, the ABA appointed a
Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards chaired by Robert Kutak to
recommend revisions to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Between 1977 and
1983, the Kutak Commission engaged the profession and the public in an
unprecedented process of ethical reform, circulating four drafts of its own reformulation of the Code into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3
(2001 edition).
20
See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
21
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS.
1 (1975).
22
In 1976, philosopher Charles Fried published a philosophical defense of the
morality of the lawyer-client relationship as a “special-purpose friendship.” Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). These two articles set the agenda for further discussion in
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legal ethics, David Luban commented that they “inaugurated a new
approach to legal ethics . . . that centers on the issue of role morality
and its conflict with universal morality.” 23 However, as Part II of this
Article will demonstrate, the conflict between professional role
morality and universal morality was not the only way that the
important moral questions in legal practice could have been framed.
Wasserstrom’s earliest essay raised a concern—arguably at the center
of his critique of legal professionalism—that lawyers tend to objectify
their clients in terms of the clients’ legal interests—what I am calling
the problem of legal objectification.
This part will explore how moral theory developed away from
Wasserstrom’s diagnosis of legal objectification as a central moral
problem of legal professionalism and came to rely in theory on the
same kind of legal objectification that Wasserstrom condemned in
practice: the cardboard construction of clients defined solely by the
maximization of their legal interests.
A.

Zeal at the Margin as a Role Morality for Lawyers

The most important force in defining and solidifying the study
of legal ethics as an academic discipline came from the Working
Group on Legal Ethics. 24 This group of leading moral philosophers,
the field of philosophy. Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 18, at 878-79.
Other early articles included Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a
Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978); Warren Lehman, The Pursuit
of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979); David Luban, Paternalism and
the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454; David Luban, The Lysistratian
Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J.
637; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AMER. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 613; Gerald J.
Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U L. REV. 63 (1980);
Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
WIS. L. REV. 1529; Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of
Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669 673 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, Christian Theories of
Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1975).; Thomas
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as a Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231
(1979); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29;
William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32
STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought,
36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). See also essays collected in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban, ed. 1983).
23
Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 18, at 878-79.
24
The Working Group was built on a foundation laid in 1977 when the Council for
Philosophical Studies held an Institute on Law and Ethics. Conversation with David
Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Washington D.C.,
3/23/07).

6

BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS
legal scholars and practitioners met during 1981-82 to present and
discuss a series of papers at the University of Maryland’s Center for
Philosophy and Public Policy. 25 David Luban, then a young research
associate at the Center, devised an ambitious research agenda for the
Working Group of “hard, unsolved, and mostly unexplored issues in
legal ethics that are amenable to treatment by moral philosophy.” 26
Most of the research agenda for the Working Group centered
on a certain kind of question: what lawyers should do when their
professional duties require them to take or condone actions they would
otherwise consider immoral. 27 The essays coming out of the Working
Group were published in 1984 in an influential edited volume called
The Good Lawyer. 28 The basic premise of this volume was to
examine, not the nature of lawyers’ ethical lapses, but whether “the
professional ideal is itself morally worthy.” 29 As philosopher Charles
Fried had put it in an early article, the question was whether “a good
lawyer [can] be a good person.” 30
The philosophers who explored the question of whether a good
lawyer could be a good person framed the issue in terms of conflicts
between a lawyer’s professional “role morality” and the obligations of
“ordinary morality.” 31 As defined by moral philosophers, a “role
morality” is a set of norms that apply to us in the various social roles
we occupy in life—parent, soldier, lawyer—which are narrower than
the norms of ordinary morality that apply to all of us as persons. 32
25

Preface, THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at vii. The Working Group included
philosophers Richard Wasserstrom, Gerald Postema and Bernard Williams, who had
already contributed to moral theory in legal ethics. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals, supra note x; Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 21; Bernard
Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 54, 63-66 (1981). It included legal ethicists
Charles Wolfram and Murray Schwartz. It also included Robert Kutak, who was at
that time chairing the ABA commission drafting the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. See Preface, supra, at viii.
26
Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse, supra note 18, at 452.
27
Id. at 456, 462. The other, less prominent, questions involved the provision of
legal services to indigents. Id. at 471-73.
28
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22.
29
David Luban, Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 1, 1.
30
Fried, supra note 22, at 1060.
31
Luban, Introduction, supra note 29, at 1.
32
See Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
22, at 25; DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-27
(1988). But see Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in
THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 259, 259-62 (arguing that it is more helpful
and less misleading to consider such conflicts in terms of the dispositions that
professionals acquire as a result of their education and training).
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What makes the situation of role morality complicated from a
philosophical point of view is that even while we are occupying a
social role, we are still persons subject to ordinary moral obligations. 33
The important and interesting question for moral philosophers of that
time was how to resolve conflicts between what it is right for us to do
in our professional roles and what is morally right for us to do as
persons. 34
Because moral philosophers sought to frame the important and
interesting questions in legal ethics in terms of conflicts between role
morality and ordinary morality, their first order of business was to
define lawyers’ role morality in terms that would create such conflicts.
The task of articulating a morally problematic “role morality” for
lawyers was accomplished through articulating and critiquing what has
come to be known as the “standard conception” of the lawyer’s role,
defined by principles of partisanship and neutrality. 35 As defined in
the early legal ethical writings, the principle of partisanship requires
lawyers to maximize their clients’ objectives “within, but all the way
up to the limits of the law.” 36 The principle of neutrality relieves
lawyers of moral responsibility for the harmful effects on others of
actions taken in pursuit of their clients’ objectives. 37 Under the
standard conception, a lawyer’s professional behavior is constrained
by only two parameters: the client’s objectives and the limits of the
law. 38 Notably, the standard conception does not include independent
moral responsibility for furthering the public good or for regarding the
rights or interests of individuals who might be harmed by the legal
representation. 39 Under the standard conception, such considerations
are not within the lawyer’s job description. The responsibility of
ensuring that justice emerges from the clash of competing partisan
views of the law and facts in a case is placed on the “broader
institutional shoulders” of the adversary system itself. 40 The

33

LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 105-16.
Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, supra note 32, at 25-29.
35
Different authors have called the principles by different names and defined the
principles slightly differently. LUBAN, supra note 32, at 7. For different
formulations, see Postema, supra note 22, at 73; Schwartz, Professionalism and
Accountability, supra note 22, at 673; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 22,
at 36.
36
Postema, supra note 22, at 73.
37
Id. at 73; Schwartz, supra note 22, at 673; Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra
note 22, at 36.
38
Postema, supra note 22, at 74.
39
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 8
(1998).
40
Postema, supra note 22, at 64.
34
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combination of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality was posited as the
root of the problems of legal professionalism.
To create tension between role morality and ordinary morality,
moral theorists gave the “limits of the law” and “client objective”
parameters a particular and extreme interpretation. The “limits of the
law” parameter was interpreted broadly to embrace any colorable
interpretation that the law can arguably sustain—a style of
interpretation David Luban called “zeal at the margin.” 41 Lawyers
who advocate zealously at the margin of the law do not engage in good
faith interpretation of the law, but treat legal limits instrumentally,
looking for ways around or loopholes through them. 42 Accordingly,
they push the “limits of the law” that are meant to constrain the pursuit
of their clients’ interests “well past whatever moral and political
insight constitutes the ‘spirit’ of the law in question.” 43 Defined in
these terms, the “limits of the law” are not really limits at all; they are
challenges to the cleverness and gamesmanship of lawyers. 44 Because
“zeal at the margin” was defined as pushing law beyond moral limits,
the pursuit of “zeal at the margin” was virtually guaranteed to generate
conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality.
But lawyers cannot get out to the margin of the law and
morality on their own. The standard conception defines a lawyer’s
partisan duties as the loyal pursuit of a client’s objectives. 45 A lawyer
is unlikely to experience conflicts between ordinary and role morality
when representing altruistic clients whose objectives include doing the
right thing and treating others fairly. Even clients who are motivated
primarily by self-interest but still care about containing litigation costs,
preserving long-standing business relationships with present
adversaries, or maintaining their reputations in the community will
have an interest in avoiding the far reaches of “zeal at the margin.” 46
To push lawyers out to the margin where the philosophically
interesting conflicts arise, legal ethicists had to construct clients whose
objectives were defined solely in terms of maximizing their legal
interests—their wealth, freedom, or power over others—in disregard

41

DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, 19, 26 (2007) (“zealous advocacy always means zeal at the margin”).
42
Id. at 25-26; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 16-17.
43
Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, at 26.
44
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 17.
45
Postema, supra note 22, at 73; MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(a) (2002) (a lawyer
is to abide by a client’s decision regarding the objectives of representation).
46
See Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 2627 (1991).
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of the consequences to others and in disregard of their own long-term
relationship and reputational interests.
It is only by equating “zeal at the margin” with what it means
to be a “good lawyer” that the critiques raised by early legal ethicists
become critiques of legal professionalism, rather than critiques of bad
lawyering. If a good person could be a good lawyer most of the time,
the conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality would
materialize in only exceptional cases. And a critique of the
exceptional case does not serve the theoretical purpose of
demonstrating how the professional ideal itself—the “role morality” of
lawyers—is morally corrupt.
B.

Critiques of the Standard Conception

Moral theorists mounted essentially two critiques of the
standard conception, one of which focused on the viability of public
policy justifications for lawyers’ partisan dedication to their clients’
interests, and the other of which focused on whether lawyers who
practiced according to the standard conception could themselves be
good persons. However, these critiques depended for their force and
vitality on a vision of lawyers who push the law as far as it could go
out of loyalty to cardboard clients bent on wrongdoing and unable to
be persuaded off that course.
1.

The Adversary System Excuse Critique

Early moral theoretical writings questioned the adequacy of
traditional appeals to the adversary system to justify lawyers’
representation of morally reprehensible clients or the use of morally
questionable tactics. 47 Adversarial partisan ethics are traditionally
justified by arguing that zealous pursuit of a client’s interests
ultimately serves public goals even if it produces what seems like
This traditional view of the
injustice in the situation at hand. 48
adversary system, into which members of the legal profession are
socialized, has been defended by utilitarian arguments that adversarial
testing leads to more accurate truth-finding; procedural justice
arguments about the power of adversarial proceedings in effectuating
the legitimacy of law; and the consonance of partisan representation

47
48

Wasserstrom, supra note 21, at 12.
The most prominent early example is FREEDMAN, supra note 17.
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with liberal democratic values of individual autonomy, dignity and
fairness. 49
Moral theorists responded that the standard conception—and
its endorsement of instrumental manipulation of the law to maximize a
client’s legal interests—may accurately capture a lawyer’s moral
duties in some kinds of legal practice, most notably criminal defense.50
However, they argued, lawyers wrongly invoke arguments based on
the adversary system even outside the contexts in which partisan zeal
is justified, such as non-litigation settings 51 and civil litigation
between private parties. 52 In the best-known and most sustained
theoretical critique of the lawyer’s partisan role, David Luban
systematically critiqued arguments that the adversary system was the
best way to determine truth, the best way to protect legal rights, or the
best way to reflect society’s commitment to enhancing personal
autonomy and protecting human dignity. 53
Rather than relying on blanket appeals to the “adversary
system excuse” to justify their behavior, Luban argued that lawyers
should take into account the moral justifications for their adversarial
role and weigh the strength of those justifications against the moral
harm that adhering to the role would cause. 54 Where a lawyer
represents an individual squaring off against the state or a powerful
49

See generally, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 13-43 (3d ed. 2004) (cataloguing systemic arguments in favor of
adversarial ethics); Pepper, supra note 22.
50
Moral theorists have generally excused criminal defense lawyers from ordinary
moral obligations, noting the different public policies at stake in criminal defense.
See, e.g. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729
(1993); Murray L. Schwartz, Making the True Look False and the False Look True,
41 SW. L.J. 1135 (1988). But see William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
51
Schwartz, supra note 22 (arguing that justifications based on the adversary system
do not hold in non-litigation contexts, such as negotiating and counseling, in which
the corrective backstop of an impartial arbiter in missing).
52
Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 22, at 150 (lawyers in civil cases should be held morally accountable for the
objectives of the clients they choose to represent and whether the tactics they employ
assist or undermine the ascertainment of truth).
53
The critique was initially laid out in Luban’s own contribution to THE GOOD
LAWYER, entitled The Adversary System Excuse, which has been reprinted in a recent
volume of essays, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 41. This essay
was refined and expanded to cover five chapters of his book, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE.
LUBAN, supra note 32. William Simon has developed a similar critique of traditional
justifications for adversary ethics. See SIMON, supra note 39.
54
This weighing involves a four-step process, which is explained in detail in LUBAN,
supra note 32, at 128-47.
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institution—exemplified by the paradigm of criminal defense—Luban
argued that the moral justifications for the adversary system are strong
and typically require “the kind of partisan zeal characterized in the
standard conception.” 55 In representing clients with greater or roughly
equal power to their opponents, however, the adversary system is only
weakly justified by a pragmatic argument that it “seems to do as good
a job as any at finding truth and protecting legal rights,” and because
it’s the system we already have. 56 Because the adversary system is so
weakly justified in such cases, he concluded, it “doesn’t excuse much
more than the most minor deviations from common morality.” 57
Though theoretically valid, Luban’s critique of the “adversary
system excuse” depended for its force on images of lawyers who
manipulate the law, the facts, and the rules that govern their own
behavior. For example, in critiquing the consequentialist argument
that the adversary system is the best way to ascertain truth, he conjured
the image of the zealous advocate who starts with the story that best
serves client’s legal interests, “reasons backwards to what the facts
must be, dignifies this fantasy by labeling it her ‘theory of the case,’
and then cobbles together whatever evidence can be used to support
this ‘theory.’” 58 The problem with this kind of advocacy, he argued, is
that it starts from the “standpoint of the client’s interests” rather than
from the client’s actual perspective. 59 Setting up one manipulative and
misleading version of the facts against another equally manipulative
and misleading version of the facts was more likely to result in
obfuscation and confusion than the determination of truth. 60
Luban’s argument against the claim that the adversary system
is the best way to protect legal rights proceeded along a similar course.
He conceded that individuals in society may need adversarial counsel
to vindicate legitimate legal rights. However, he argued—invoking
both “zeal at the margin” and cardboard clients—this does not support
“[t]he no-holds-barred zealous advocate [who] tries to get everything

55

Id. at 148.
Id. at 92. Luban suggests, lawyers in civil cases would be enjoined from deceitful
practices and from inflicting “morally unjustifiable damage on other people.” Id. at
157. They may not take exception from the general moral obligation of obedience to
the law by manipulating the law “to achieve outcomes that negate its generality or
violate its spirit.” Id. And, they may not pursue legally permissible but
“substantively unjust results.” Id.
57
Id. at 149.
58
Id. at 73.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 68-74.
56
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the law can give (if that is the client’s wish).” 61 When lawyers use
“tricks of the trade” like delay tactics or driving up costs to gain a
settlement, they are infringing their opponents’ rights, not vindicating
their clients’ rights. 62
Luban’s critiques of zealous partisanship also invoke the image
of cardboard clients to discredit the notion that promoting individual
autonomy and human dignity has intrinsic moral worth. The moral
worth of pursuing autonomy or protecting dignity, he argued, derives
from the goodness of the clients a lawyer represents. Appeals to
autonomy cannot justify lawyers in helping individuals use their
freedom under the law to cause unjustifiable harm and violate the
autonomy of others. 63 Likewise, honoring a client’s human dignity by
providing her with an advocate to tell her story is good only insofar as
the lawyer tells the client’s story in good faith. 64 Lawyers who use the
law to help clients bully others, manipulate legal processes or
deliberately distort the facts cannot rely on appeals to autonomy and
dignity to justify the adversary system’s “peculiar requirement of onesided zeal at the margin of the legal and the moral.” 65
2.

The Role Disposition Critique

While the “adversary system excuse” critique focused on the
adequacy of public policy justifications for adversarial zeal, the second
kind of critique was concerned primarily with what Daniel Markovitz
has called “legal ethics from the lawyer’s point of view.” 66 From the
lawyer’s point of view, the issue is not how to justify roledifferentiated behavior to the rest of society, but how lawyers
personally cope with the moral wrongs their profession requires them
to commit. 67 What is at stake is the lawyer’s personal integrity, or
ability to live according to values that he has chosen and can endorse
as part of a coherent life-plan. 68
The role disposition theorists’ critique draws on a tradition
pioneered by philosopher Bernard Williams, which focuses on the way

61

Id. at 75.
Id.
63
Id. at 83. See also Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative, supra note 22.
64
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE supra note 32, at 86-87.
65
Id. at 84.
66
Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J. L. &
HUM. 209 (2003).
67
Markovits, supra note x, at 220.
68
Id. at 223.
62
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moral agents experience moral obligation. 69 As a philosopher,
Williams is known for his colorful examples illustrating the internal
experience of morality: a lorry driver who accidentally runs over a
young child; 70 and the plight of Jim, a man forced by a military
dictator to personally execute an innocent villager to prevent the
dictator from executing twenty innocents. 71 Williams’s philosophical
work builds on the strongly intuitive notion that our moral concerns in
these situations cannot be fully expiated by telling us that the moral
harm we cause—injuring a child by accident or executing an innocent
person under coercion—is not really our fault.72 A theory that delivers
the answer that causing such harm “isn’t morally wrong” is incomplete
because it fails to capture the moral experience of acting—or being
forced to act—contrary to one’s own values.
Legal ethicists have used Williams’s examples of the lorry
driver and Jim and the Villagers as analogies for the situation of
lawyers whose professional role obligations require them to act
contrary to ordinary moral obligations. 73 The problem with the
standard conception, they argue, is that it defines a “good lawyer” as a
lawyer who can carry out partisan duties without experiencing
personal moral qualms, and it thus encourages lawyers to embrace
moral detachment in their professional work. 74
Following in
69

See B. A. O. Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PRACTICAL REASONING 91 (Joseph
Raz, ed. 1978) (discussing the nature of conflicts between one’s own competing
moral judgments); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK,
supra note 25, at 20 (discussing the phenomenon of “agent-regret” we feel upon
causing harm accidentally); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C.
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973)
(describing the failure of utilitarianism to capture the moral experience of being
required to commit a moral wrong in order to optimize moral outcomes).
70
Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 69, at 28.
71
Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, supra note 69.
72
For example Williams argues that the lorry driver should feel a special kind of
“agent-regret” that is different from the regret felt by a spectator who witnessed the
accident. Williams, Moral Luck, supra note 69, at 28. Likewise, although Jim would
be morally justified in accepting the dictator’s invitation—and Jim might even be
morally self-indulgent if he refused it—killing an innocent villager by his own hand
still alienates Jim from himself and from projects close to the center of his moral
personality in a way that observing someone else commit the deed would not.
73
See, e.g. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 68-69 (discussing the
lorry driver example); Markovits, supra note 66, at 221-41 (extended analysis of
Williams’ example of Jim and the Villagers as applied to lawyers). Williams himself
suggested that the creation of a professional class of amoral lawyers was perhaps a
necessary evil that society tolerates because lawyers need to get their hands dirty if
they are to get their jobs done. See Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character,
in WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK, supra note 25, at 54, 63-66; Bernard Williams,
Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, supra note 32, at 266.
74
Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 78.
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Williams’ tradition, they argue that moral detachment is ultimately an
ineffective strategy for coping with the deviations from ordinary
morality that lawyers’ professional role requires, because it creates a
disposition toward amorality that aggravates the level of harm that
lawyers are willing to visit on others and is ultimately unsatisfying to
lawyers themselves. 75
While Luban was clear in both defining “zeal at the margin”
and directing his critique of adversary ethics against it, role disposition
theorists did little to spell out the conditions that pose threats to
lawyers’ personal integrity. They relied instead on vague assertions
that legal representation requires lawyers to engage in unspecified
“knavery,” 76 or to regularly commit acts that most people would
consider “lying, cheating and abusing.” 77 Or, they claimed, a lawyer’s
personal integrity is put at issue by the very fact of legal
representation, because legal representation necessarily requires
lawyers to disingenuously present legal and factual claims they do not
personally believe. 78
However, as critics have noted, the sweeping characterization
of legal representation as “lying, cheating and abusing” can be made
only by stripping lawyers’ acts from the contexts in which they are
performed. 79 Understood within the rules and expectations that
govern the practice of law, many of the tactics that moral theorists
target would not ordinarily be considered lying or cheating. 80 And,
some of the more abusive tactics cited by legal ethicists—such as
asking invasive and embarrassing questions at a deposition—arguably
cannot be understood outside the context of legal representation at
all. 81 Moreover, in Williams’s examples, it is the extremity of the
75

Postema, Self-Image, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 22, at 306 (arguing that
professional detachment leads to a life characterized by “confusion, contradiction
and self-deception”); Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 68-69
(arguing that morally detached lawyers come to view the harm they cause as if they
were spectators rather than participants).
76
See id. at 63; Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75, at 288. Postema himself
expressed doubt about the claim that “knavery” is a regular aspect of legal
representation, adopting the characterization for purposes of argument, but noting his
own view that the claim is “exaggerated and too often romanticized.” Id. at 288.
77
Markovits, supra note 66, at 217-19.
78
Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 77; Markovits, supra note 66, at
218.
79
Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s
Point of View, 16 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 45, 61-63 (2004).
80
Id. at 62-63.
81
W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 29 (1999) (“it is almost impossible to think of a relevantly similar
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moral harm that creates the threat to the agent’s personal identity. 82 A
lawyer who found her client’s version of the facts plausible would be
hard-pressed to claim that her personal integrity was placed in
jeopardy by fact of legal representation itself.
The role disposition theorists’ claim that adherence to
professional role necessarily threatens lawyers’ personal integrity
begins to make sense only if we imagine that lawyers routinely
represent clients with goals that transgress ordinary moral bounds. 83
Like the critique of the “adversary system excuse,” the role disposition
theorists’ critique is based on an implicit reliance on cardboard clients
who push their lawyers up to and past the limits of the law.
C.

Moral Lawyers as the Solution to the Problems of Legal
Professionalism

Although the critiques of traditional partisanship proceeded
along two tracks—a critique of the “adversary system excuse” and an
analysis of the effect of legal representation on lawyers’ moral
characters—they converged on a common solution: lawyers should
reject the moral neutrality inherent in the standard conception and
draw on their independent moral judgment to reign in their partisan
advocacy. The purpose of importing ordinary moral considerations
into legal representation was to supplement the parameters defining
professional behavior under the standard conception—client objectives
and the limits of the law—with additional constraints based on the
assessments of right and wrong that lawyers would make outside their
professional roles.
Luban’s alternative ideal of professionalism—which he called
moral activism—imposed on lawyers the moral responsibility to
“break role” in compelling moral circumstances to respond to the
case that would arise in everyday moral life, where an agent was duty-bound to ask
embarrassing questions of complete strangers, while the strangers were absolutely
required to answer them”). Williams’s own view was that it was difficult to talk
about divergences between ordinary morality and role morality by focusing on
lawyers’ actions because “the same act can be acceptable in some contexts and not in
others.” Williams, Professional Morality, supra note 73, at 260-61.
82
Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 75 (“as the moral distance
between private and professional moralities increases, the temptation to adopt one or
the other extreme strategy of identification also increases: one either increasingly
identifies with the role or seeks resolutely to detach oneself from it”); Williams,
Professional Morality, supra note 73, at 263-64.
83
See Markovits, supra note 66, at 262-63 (arguing that it is the routine and habitual
nature of lawyers’ wrongdoing, rather than its severity, that erodes a lawyer’s moral
character).
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human pathos of those on whom harm would be visited as a result of
adhering to professional role obligations. 84 To address the deleterious
effects of the standard conception on lawyers’ moral characters,
Gerald Postema made the similar suggestion that lawyers should
replace the standard conception’s strategies of moral detachment with
the exercise of lawyers’ “engaged moral judgment.” 85 Rather than
viewing their role as fixed by the standard conception of neutral
partisanship, he advocated that lawyers cultivate “mature, responsible
moral judgment in the[ir] professional activities,” 86 drawing on a
broad range of “ordinary moral beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and
relationships.” 87
While the prospect of lawyers exercising responsible moral
judgment sounds unobjectionable—even appealing—moral theorists
imported it into their alternative ideals of professionalism along with
problematic assumptions about lawyers and clients. As we have seen,
to create the kind of dilemmas they wanted to discuss, moral theorists
assumed that clients were basically self-interested and uncaring toward
others. In formulating their solution, they made the opposite
assumption about lawyers, whom they posited as primarily motivated
to lead moral lives and pursue the public interest. The alternative ideal
of professionalism that emerged from these assumptions of moral
lawyers and cardboard clients positioned lawyers as the moral and
social conscience of legal representation—providing a necessary check
on the self-seeking behavior of their clients.
When he first introduced his solution to the critique of the
“adversary system excuse,” David Luban was skeptical that holding
lawyers morally accountable would have much of an impact on the
profession. “Lawyers get paid for their services, not for their
consciences,” he wrote, “and criticizing an ideology won’t change the
world.” 88 In later writings, he increasingly came to identify moral
activism with an alternative ideal historically situated within legal
professionalism. 89 He connected moral activism with a “noblesse
oblige” tradition rooted in the functionalist sociology of Talcott
84

Luban calls this the “morality of acknowledgment.” LUBAN, supra note 32, at 127.
See also David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course
Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REV. 424, 451-52 (1990) (clarifying
that the duty to “break role” in compelling moral circumstances captured the truest
essence of his alternative ideal of moral activism).
85
Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 83 (emphasis in the original).
86
Id.; Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75, at 289.
87
Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 70.
88
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 41, at 63-64.
89
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 160.
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Parsons and the Progressive politics of Louis Brandeis, which viewed
lawyers as public servants mediating between clients’ self-interest and
the public good. 90
The vision of “gentleman lawyers” or “lawyer-statesmen” who
act as buffers between self-interested clients and the public good has
gained currency in legal ethics in the decades following Luban’s
articulation of the moral activist ideal. 91 Some legal ethicists trace the
roots of this vision to a republican notion of lawyers as a “virtuous
elite” whose professional autonomy and freedom from market forces
position them well to secure the goods that would allow society to
Others posit that lawyers’ professional training and
flourish. 92
experience endow them with superior capacities of deliberation and
practical judgment that specially equip them for the role of wise
counselors. 93 The very notion of professionalism has been understood
by some as an attempt to recapture in neutral and egalitarian terms a
“gentleman’s ethic” more characteristic of a bygone age in which
lawyers were recognized as “America’s aristocracy.” 94
However, as critics are quick to point out, the image of the
“gentleman lawyer” has profoundly inegalitarian roots in elitist
practices that historically excluded women, Blacks, Jews, and Eastern
European immigrants from the profession of law. The biggest
challenge for those who hearken back to the lawyer-statesman ideal is
whether it is possible to recast the vision of the lawyer-statesman in
egalitarian terms, or whether elitism is an inherent part of the vision. 95
When you play out the picture of moral activist lawyers who
“take it upon themselves to judge and shape client projects” to fit the
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Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
717, 739 (1988) (the lawyer is “a buffer who mediates between illegitimate client
desires and the social interest”). For a similar view, see William H. Simon, Babbitt
v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985).
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ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); Robert L. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B. U. L.
REV. 1, 11-19 (1988); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of
the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 250-56 (1992).
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Pearce, supra note 91, at 250-56; Gordon, supra note 91, at 14-16.
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KRONMAN, supra note 91.
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THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 49 (1991). See also Pearce, supra
note 91, at 396-97; Gordon, supra note 91, at 16-19.
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in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2025-28 (2001); SHAFFER &
SHAFFER, supra note 94, at 48-49.
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common good, 96 the problems begin to become apparent. For
example, lawyers following Luban’s “moral activist” model of client
counseling, will employ increasingly intrusive techniques that begin
with appealing to clients’ consciences and inventing alternative ways
for clients to satisfy their interests. If those tactics do not dissuade the
client, moral activist lawyers may go on to mislead clients by
emphasizing or exaggerating the probability of negative consequences
of an immoral course of action or threatening to withdraw, which
would cost the client money and perhaps even legal representation. If
all else fails, the lawyer will betray the client by acting in accordance
with the lawyer’s own values, even over the client’s objection. 97
In a particularly heavy-handed description of moral activist
representation, Luban describes the “lawyer for the damned” who
“takes on cases that no one else will come near, cases in which the
client has for one reason or another rightly become odious or
untouchable in the eyes of mankind.” 98 In accepting representation of
such odious clients, the lawyer “attempt[s] not merely to save the
client from the consequences of her deeds but to transform and redeem
her.” 99 Luban followed his discussion of lawyers “transforming and
redeeming” their clients by extolling a 1905 speech in which Louis
Brandeis commended the superior practical wisdom of lawyers, which
Brandeis suggested endowed lawyers with “a position materially
different from that of other men . . . the position of the adviser of
men.” 100
The combination of evangelism and elitism in these references
paints a rather frightening picture of the lawyer-client relationship, and
to his credit Luban has explicitly disclaimed its most disturbing
aspects. Lawyers, he has suggested, are not “more virtuous, decent
courageous or compassionate than the rest of us,” but have “the same
moral insight as anyone else.” 101 And, he has insisted, the heart of
moral activist client counseling is best described as “discussing with
the client the rightness and wrongness of her projects and the possible
impact of those projects on ‘the people’ in the same matter-of-fact and
(one hopes) unmoralistic manner that one discusses the financial
aspects of a representation.” 102
96

Luban, Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 90, at 737-38.
Id.; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 173-74.
98
Id. at 162.
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Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 171, quoting Louis D. Brandeis, Opportunity in the Law.
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LUBAN, supra note x, at 171.
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However, the descriptions of the goals and methods of moral
activism continue to veer in the direction of moral elitism. 103 The
problem is that to defend the lawyer-statesman ideal, one has to
explain why lawyers are better situated than their clients to exercise
responsible moral judgment in legal representation. And, moral
theorists in legal ethics face a high hurdle in that regard. The demands
of “ordinary morality” are inherently egalitarian; they do not depend
on social status, professional training or expertise. Ordinary morality
applies to us because we are persons, and lawyers and clients are on an
equal moral footing as persons. Unless one can provide an explanation
of why lawyers are better situated than clients to exercise moral
judgment, the chances of advancing the public good by pursuing the
client’s moral choices would seem to be just as great as the chances of
advancing the public good by shaping client projects according to the
lawyer’s moral choices. 104
Moreover, if one posits a morally pluralistic society, in which
there are different and divergent reasonable conceptions of what
morality requires, the idea of lawyers policing the morality of their
clients’ projects becomes especially problematic. 105 The lawyerstatesman ideal requires lawyers to assess both the public good and
their clients’ deviance from the public good. However, judgments
about the public good depend on the application of moral standards
JUSTICE, supra, note 32, at 174. He clarified that the references to lawyers
“transforming and redeeming” their clients were meant for the special case of the
“odious or untouchable” client, and did not represent the heart of his view of client
counseling. Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra, at 1025. And, he
cautioned that lawyers should remain open to the “possibility that it is the lawyer
rather than the client who will eventually modify her moral stance.” LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, supra note 32, at 173.
103
Luban has emphasized that the “element of truth” in Brandeis’ speech was that
lawyers are better situated than their clients to consider the common good. Luban,
Noblesse Oblige Tradition, supra note 90, at 725. And, he has more than one time
suggested that lawyers should see it as their responsibility to “make their clients
better” and actively “steer their clients in the direction of the public good.” Id. at
721; LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 171.
104
The question of whether lawyers are better situated to make moral decisions in
legal representation is taken up in Part III.E.
105
The problems that moral pluralism poses for legal ethical theories are a subject of
increasing attention within legal ethics. See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role
Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers,
Justice and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005);
Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society,
63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995); Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting
Professional Identity, 74 COLO. L. REV. 1 76-90 (2003); W. Bradley Wendel, Public
Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999).
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about which persons in a morally pluralistic society may reasonably
disagree. 106 If lawyers impose limits on the pursuit of their clients’
legal interests—limits that spring from their own understanding of
morality—they abandon their public role as channels through which
clients can access the law. 107
The early moral theorists in legal ethics did not have to
confront the challenges that moral pluralism presents to their ideal of
the lawyer-statesman nor to explain why it was more appropriate for
lawyers to take moral responsibility for the decisions made in legal
representation than to leave that responsibility with clients. By staying
within the assumptions of moral lawyers and cardboard clients, legal
ethicists were able to posit clients as self-interested and morally
suspect and lawyers as repositories of public values.
Because the early moral theorists critiqued an extreme and
narrow vision of partisanship, they concluded that the parameters that
define lawyers’ professional duties under the standard conception—
client objectives and the limits of the law—were too weak to constrain
lawyers from harming third parties and eroding the public interest.
Legal ethicists did not question whether legal practice according to the
standard conception served clients well; they assumed that it did. 108
They did not consider alternative ideals of partisanship that would
encourage lawyers to be more sensitive to clients’ concerns, because in
their view lawyers were already overly solicitous of clients. They
focused their attention on whether unmitigated partisanship served the
public well and whether it allowed lawyers to lead morally defensible
lives. Having concluded that it failed on both scores, they sought
solutions that would bolster lawyers’ duties to the public at the
expense of their loyalty to their clients.
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For a more extended version of this argument, see Kruse, Lawyers, Clients and
the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. (2005).
107
Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 AMER.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 657, 666. See also W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).
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Postema is an exception. In his early essay, he argued that moral detachment
adversely affected the lawyer-client relationship by disengaging lawyers’ abilities to
relate to their clients as persons and to recognize the clients’ own moral
personalities. Postema, Moral Responsibility, supra note 22, at 80. However, the
solution he proposed left the moral direction of legal representation in the hands of
lawyers with no guidance as to the meaning or goals of morally engaged
partisanship. In a follow-up essay, the concern for clients was absent from discussion
and Postema focused on the effects of amoral lawyering on the personal integrity of
lawyers. Postema, Self-Image, supra note 75.
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The focus on moral lawyers and cardboard clients prevented
the early ethicists from exploring the possibility that the real problems
of legal professionalism might originate—not primarily from selfish
clients who push their lawyers to the limits of the law—but primarily
from lawyers who focus too narrowly on their clients’ legal interests
and fail to view their clients as whole persons with a myriad of nonlegal concerns. The next part explores how theoretical legal ethics
might have unfolded if moral theorists had pursued the idea that the
central moral problem of legal professionalism is not the conflict that
lawyers face between role morality and ordinary morality, but the
problem of legal objectification.
II.

THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: LEGAL OBJECTIFICATION
CENTRAL PROBLEM OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM

AS THE

A serious analysis of problem of legal objectification is a road
not taken in legal ethics. But it is a road that could have been taken.
This part traces its potential, noting that the earliest essay outlining the
moral issues in legal professionalism identified the problem of legal
objectification and called for a solution of limited
deprofessionalization that would decrease the professional distance
between lawyers and clients. A concurrent movement in the legal
interviewing and counseling literature advocated a client-centered
approach to legal representation that re-oriented the lawyer-client
relationship in ways responsive to the problem of legal objectification.
Had these threads come together, they could have redefined the
problems with legal professionalism and suggested a different kind of
solution.
A.

Wasserstrom’s Lost Concern for Legal Objectification

In 1975, Richard Wasserstrom’s published a groundbreaking
essay that raised “two moral criticisms of lawyers,” each of which
“concern the lawyer-client relationship.” 109 The first criticism was the
familiar concern that in carrying out their professional role obligations,
lawyers are required to further the interests of morally unworthy
clients and to disregard the moral harm that partisan advocacy visits on
others. 110
As we have seen in Part I, this criticism of legal
professionalism came to dominate the discourse as legal ethicists
framed the moral issues in legal ethics as conflicts between role
morality and ordinary morality.

109
110

Wasserstrom, supra note 21, at 1.
Id. at 3-4.
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Wasserstrom’s second moral criticism is less familiar: that the
lawyer-client relationship is itself morally suspect because lawyers
tend to objectify their clients in legal terms and to treat them
paternalistically. 111 “[F]rom the professional’s point of view,” he
wrote, “the client is seen and responded to more like an object than a
human being, and more like a child than an adult.” 112 The problem of
lawyer paternalism—treating a client “more like a child than an
adult”—has received limited attention from legal ethicists. 113
However, the problem of lawyers’ objectification of their clients—
treating a client “more like an object than a human being”—has gone
largely unnoticed as a moral problem in its own right. 114
What is hardly ever discussed—perhaps hardly ever noticed—
is that Wasserstrom viewed his two moral criticisms as aspects of a
single underlying pathology. 115 It may seem a paradox, Wasserstrom
noted, that a lawyer could be both excessively preoccupied with a
client’s concerns and inattentive to the client. 116 However, he
explained, the lawyer accomplishes both by being “overly concerned
with the interest of the client and at the same time fail[ing] to view the
client as a whole person.” 117 According to Wasserstrom, lawyers are
not alone. All professionals tend to objectify their clients or patients
by focusing attention on the subject matter of their expertise.
Professionals in medicine, law and psychiatry tend to view a client or
patient “not as a whole person but a segment or aspect of a person—an
interesting kidney problem, a routine marijuana possession case, or
another adolescent with an identity crisis.” 118 For lawyers, the
problem of legal objectification arises from viewing clients narrowly
in terms of their legal interests alone.
The tendency of lawyers as professionals to objectify their
clients reveals the two kinds of moral disregard—for clients as whole
persons and for anyone not a client—as different aspects of the same
111
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problem. The root of the problem lies in the narrow definition lawyers
give to their client’s objectives. Clients, it might be argued, come to
lawyers with the capacity and desire to be moral; it is lawyers, with the
analytical precision of their professional training, who slough off
clients’ non-legal concerns and focus only on the legally relevant
aspects of the case. Consonant with their professional training,
lawyers “issue-spot” their clients as they would the facts in a bluebook exam, reducing client objectives to bundles of legal rights and
interests. Lawyers then pursue those legal interests in disregard of
both clients’ actual wishes and the harm caused to others. In the
process, lawyers disregard their clients’ inclinations to be cooperative,
moral and socially responsible and encourage the self-seeking
behavior that accompanies legal interest maximization.
The solution Wasserstrom proposed to this underlying
pathology of legal professionalism was a kind of limited
“deprofessionalization” of the lawyer-client relationship. He did not
go very far in elaborating what deprofessionalization might mean, and
he acknowledged that an adequate solution was difficult to envision
because there were certain “important and distinctive competencies”
that clients seek and lawyers possess. At the very end of his essay,
Wasserstrom suggested that the key to solving the puzzle of limited
deprofessionalization would have to “await an explicit effort to alter
the ways in which lawyers are educated and acculturated to view
themselves, their clients, and the relationships that ought to exist
between them.” 119
B.

Redefining the Problem: the Hidden Complicity of
Lawyers in Shaping Client Objectives

In the view of early legal ethicists, lawyers’ partisan loyalty
and moral neutrality was the source of the moral and ethical problems
that plagued legal professionalism. They defined the central problems
of professionalism as stemming from lawyers’ unquestioning
deference to clients. It was clients who pushed their lawyers to the
limits of the law where the lawyers were required by professional duty
to transgress the dictates of ordinary morality.
However, if we view legal objectification as the central
pathology of the legal profession, then pinning the problems on the
standard’s combination of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality is a
misdiagnosis. If lawyers are responsible for transforming their clients
from whole persons into bundles of legal interests, then lawyers are
119
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complicit in creating the conflicts between personal morality and
professional role morality that the early ethicists observed. Lawyers
are complicit because they are the ones who define the clients’
objectives narrowly as legal interest maximization in the first place.
The idea that lawyers shape their clients’ objectives based on a
particular and professionalized perspective is supported by empirical
research of the legal profession across a number of legal practice
fields. 120 In one recent study, for example, lawyers and clients in
medical malpractice cases were surveyed to determine their view of
plaintiffs’ objectives in malpractice suits. When asked why plaintiffs
sue, lawyers on all sides of litigation—representing doctors, hospitals
and patients—“either immediately or ultimately described the issue as
one of money—solely or primarily.” 121 By contrast, the vast majority
of medical malpractice plaintiffs did not cite money as their sole or
even their primary motivation; and, sixty-five percent of plaintiffs
didn’t mention money until they were prompted. 122 What plaintiffs
said they wanted to gain by suing were admissions of responsibility,
the prevention of harm to others, answers to their questions, retribution
for misconduct, and apologies for the suffering caused by medical
error. 123 The study concluded that the discontinuity between lawyer
and client understandings of clients’ objectives was due in part to the
fact that “lawyers are trained to operate according to rights and rules,
applying law to facts and placing people and occurrences into legal
categories.” 124 As a consequence, lawyers endeavored to fit their
clients’ more emotional goals “into legally cognizable categories—
ultimately relating to monetary compensation alone.” 125
The problem of legal objectification was discussed in a pair of
other early legal ethics article. In 1978, as one part of a sweeping
critique of professional ideology, William Simon argued that lawyers
who adhere to the dominant ideology of professionalism “impute
certain basic aims to the client and . . . work to advance these imputed
120
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ends.” 126 As Simon noted, the ends are defined on the basis of egoistic
Simon
assumptions that “emphasize extreme selfishness.” 127
suggested that lawyers end up representing a “hypothetical person with
only a few crude discrete ends” who bears little resemblance to the real
client whose satisfaction relies on a complex balance of interrelated
goals within the context of cooperative social relationships. 128 In an
essay published a year later, Warren Lehman further developed
Simon’s point by analyzing how the lawyer’s instrumentalist approach
to legal advice based on the interests of a “standardized” client can
distort the decision making of clients, whose deference to their
lawyers’ expertise may cause them to overvalue factors like the tax
consequences of important life decisions. 129
Lawyers’ complicity in shaping their clients’ objectives was
also revealed—though not explicitly discussed—in Luban’s discussion
of custody blackmail in divorce cases. Luban offered custody
blackmail as an example of “precisely the sort of hardball tactic that
would be virtually impossible to justify without the standard
conception.” 130 He described it as a practice in which “the divorcing
father (at the behest of his attorney) threatens to demand joint custody
unless the mother reduces her financial demands.” 131 It is beyond the
bounds of morality, he argued, for “the zealous divorce lawyer [to]
suggest[] custody blackmail to a father who has no desire for
custody.” 132 Such a lawyer “has wronged the wife and children,
contributed to the social problem of emiserated divorced mothers,
added to the general sexism of American society and abused the legal
system.” 133
For Luban, custody blackmail was an example of the need for
lawyers to break role and take moral charge of the legal representation
by refusing to pursue a financial benefit for their clients at the cost of
moral harm to others. However, custody blackmail is also precisely
126

Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 22, at 53.
Id. at 54.
128
Id. at 55.
129
Lehman, supra note 22, at 1088-89. Lehman relates two personal anecdotes in
support of his point about tax consequences. In one, a client defers an intended gift
until a more tax advantageous time, and ends up dying in a car crash without ever
bestowing the gift. Id. at 1088. In the other, a widow recovering from alcoholism
avoids going to a lawyer for advice on selling a house that has become an emotional
and psychological burden to live in, fearful that she will be talked into delaying the
sale to gain a tax advantage. Id. at 1089.
130
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1016.
131
Id. at 1015.
132
Id. at 1018.
133
Id.
127

26

BEYOND CARDBOARD CLIENTS
the sort of hardball tactic that it is difficult to imagine a divorcing
father coming up with on his own. Luban’s own description of the
practice reveals the active participation of the divorce lawyer: the
divorcing father makes the custody demand “at the behest of his
attorney” who “suggests” it to him. It is implicit in the very definition
of the tactic that the lawyer advances a claim for custody that the client
doesn’t really want to win.
It is lawyers who begin legal
representation by constructing their clients narrowly in the image of
the clients’ legal interests who are likely to come up with the tactic of
custody blackmail in the first place. 134
C.

Re-defining the Solution: the Client-Centered Approach
to Legal Representation

At about the same time Wasserstrom was making his call for
“an explicit effort to alter the ways in which lawyers are educated and
acculturated to view themselves, their clients, and the relationships
that ought to exist between them,” 135 legal education was in the
nascent stages of a movement with just those goals. Also undergoing
fluorescence in the mid-1970s, the clinical legal education movement
was in the midst of developing a curriculum for teaching the skills and
values of lawyering in the context of live client representation. 136
However well cardboard clients worked to discuss dilemmas in the
legal ethics classroom, they were ill-fitted to the clinical teaching
context, in which law students developed relationships with actual
clients and confronted the complexities of their clients’ life situations
in their fullest dimensions.
It was within the client interviewing and counseling literature
designed for clinical teaching that a solution to the problem of legal
objectification developed. The most prominent model of lawyering to
emerge from the clinical legal education movement was the
development of client-centered representation, an approach to
134
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lawyering that encouraged lawyers to conceptualize legal
representation as problem-solving, to attend to clients’ non-legal
needs, and to include them in participatory decision-making on matters
of legal strategy. 137
Client-centered representation is taught
pervasively in law school clinical and lawyering skills courses and has
since generated a rich body of practice and pedagogy-based
scholarship about lawyering, much of which explores the internal
dynamics of the lawyer-client relationship. 138
The client-centered approach is directly responsive to the
problem of legal objectification. It urges lawyers to unlearn the
professional habit of “issue-spotting” their clients and to approach
their clients as whole persons who are more than the sum of their legal
interests. The hallmarks of the client-centered approach include
understanding the client’s problem from the client’s point of view and
shaping legal advice around the client’s values. 139 Under the clientcentered approach, hearing clients’ stories and understanding their
values, cares and commitments is the first step—and a continuing
duty—of legal representation. 140
The client-centered approach also re-orients the lawyer-client
relationship along the lines of limited de-professionalization
foreshadowed by Wasserstrom’s essay. In a highly professionalized
conception of role, lawyers exercise maximum professional control
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over strategic decisions with minimal consultation from clients.141 In
client-centered representation, the focus on understanding clients’
objectives more broadly and holistically than the sum of the clients’
legal interests tends to break down the boundaries between legal and
non-legal strategies for addressing clients’ problems. 142 By contrast,
the lawyer-statesman ideal proposed by legal ethicists reinforces a
highly professionalized view of the lawyer-client relationship. In
addition to using professional expertise to shape tactical and strategic
decisions, lawyers are encouraged to make professional judgments
about morality and the public good. Client influence and participation
in representation decisions is seen as a threat to the independence that
lawyers need to establish and maintain to play an effective role as
mediator between clients’ self-interested projects and the public
interest. 143
Although the client-centered approach has been seen as
appropriate for the contexts in which it is primarily taught—law school
clinical programs that serve poor and otherwise marginalized clients—
it has been argued to have limited application in the circles of highlypaid lawyers for high-powered clients. 144 As legal ethics has matured
as an academic discipline, legal ethicists have increasingly gravitated
toward analyzing the scandals and pressures of practice in the big law
firm, where the vision of “zeal at the margin” is “alive and well” and
the conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality can most
clearly be found. 145 Wasserstrom’s early insight—that the amoral
attitude lawyers exhibit toward others outside the lawyer-client
relationship is connected to the way lawyers treat their clients—has
141
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been lost between the diverging paths of clinical scholarship and legal
ethics.
III.

LEGAL ETHICS FOR THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS

This Part weaves the insights of client-centered representation
into legal ethics by proposing and defending a theoretical model of
client value-based representation that re-defines the standard
conception’s principles of partisanship and neutrality in the context of
three-dimensional clients who come to legal representation with a
mixture of values, commitments, relationships, hopes, dreams and
fears. It starts with the premise that client objectives are complex and
multidimensional and places client values—as the client defines
them—at the center of a lawyer’s partisan duties. When the pursuit of
a client’s objectives is redefined in the context of three-dimensional
clients, the standard conception’s principles of partisan loyalty and
moral neutrality look different. This Part argues that the redefined
versions of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality survives the critiques
that legal ethicists leveled at the extreme version of partisanship
captured by “zeal at the margin” without succumbing to the dangers of
moral elitism and moral overreaching that the lawyer-statesman model
presents.
A.

Putting Client Values at the Center of Legal
Representation

In an early article on lawyer paternalism, David Luban
provided a theoretical vocabulary of wants, values and interests with
untapped potential for addressing Wasserstrom’s puzzle of limited
deprofessionalization. 146 Wasserstrom noted that the idea of limited
de-professionalization is difficult because clients come to lawyers for
help with problems that really do require legal expertise. Although it
is problematic to reduce a client to nothing more than a bundle of legal
interests, legal issue-spotting is a core competency of lawyering and a
necessary component of virtually all legal representation. 147 The
puzzle is in figuring out how to “weaken the bad consequences” of
lawyers’ tendency to professionalize the lawyer-client relationship
“without destroying the good that lawyers do.” 148
Luban’s theoretical vocabulary re-defines client objectives in
three dimensions, suggesting that client objectives are complex,
146
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ambiguous and potentially conflicting.
Luban theoretically
distinguished three different aspects of a client’s objectives, as
follows:
• Wants are those things a client subjectively desire in the
moment; they are like facts that exist but cannot be disputed. 149
• Values are the desires with which a client most closely identify,
playing an important role in defining a client’s larger life-plans
and self-conceptions. 150
• Interests are “generalizable means to any ultimate end.” 151
They include freedom, wealth, health, power, and control over
Interests are not valuable in
other people’s actions. 152
themselves, but as means by which we can satisfy our wants
and actualize our values. 153
According to Luban’s analysis, the touchstone for a lawyer’s
appropriate intervention into client decision making is whether the
intervention supports or undermines the client in actualizing her
values. 154 The primacy of client values emerges from the way Luban
analyzes what a lawyer should do when clients’ wants, interests and
values conflict.
Luban argued that lawyers are justified in
paternalistically manipulating clients to promote the clients’ interests
in favor of the clients’ wants. 155 If a client expresses the desire to
deviate from the maximization of legal interests, Luban saw it as “the
lawyer’s job to express the conservative and restrained point of view”
from the standpoint of the client’s interests.156 Because wants come
and go, a lawyer who protects a client’s interests can serve as a sort of
“ego” to the client’s “id”—getting clients past the fleeting wants that
dominate their desires in the moment and keeping their future options
open. 157 However, lawyers are not justified in paternalistically
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manipulating clients to further the client’s interests in ways that
override the client values. 158 Because values form the core of a
client’s personality, manipulating a client to act against the client’s
values is a violation of the client’s personal integrity. 159 Such
paternalistic intervention cannot be justified because interests are not
valuable in themselves—they derive their value from their utility as
means toward other ends. 160
To place the actualization of client values at the center of legal
representation would require lawyers to assist their clients in making
decisions that are consistent with the clients’ most important goals and
life plans. As Luban and other philosophers have discussed, values are
those things that are closest to the centers of our personalities, and
which invest our lives with meaning. 161 Values play a dual role, both
motivating our actions and shaping the way we define ourselves. Our
values are in one sense normative—they provide reasons for our
actions. 162 But our values are also expressions of our identity—they
define who we are. And the motivation that values provide for our
actions is connected to the way they define who we are. We are
motivated to live our lives in accordance with our values because it is
through acting in accordance with our values that we become the
persons we want to be. 163
Living a life in accordance with our values is likely to be a
process that unfolds over time through experiences of conflict and
confrontation. In part, this is because of the diversity of values that
can form the cores of our identities. 164 We may value a life of
adventure or the life of the mind. We may value material success,
family ties, or quality time spent with friends. Our values may be
based in career choices, political commitments, projects that we have
realizing our ambitions, not in the intrinsic merits of money or power . . . in other
words, in its breadth and not in its depth.”)
158
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undertaken—anything by which we define ourselves. We may feel a
“calling” to live out our values through commitments to particular
ways of life—joining the Peace Corps, converting to a religion, even
going to law school—and those commitments may be the source of
commitment to political, religious or professional values. We may
value ourselves through relationships and in community with others,
and the ways in which these relationships and communities define us
may be at the deepest core of our identities. 165 Because of this
diversity, our values are likely to be internally inconsistent, forcing us
to choose between them as we move through life. Practical choices—
what career path to pursue, for example—will often bring our values
into internal conflict, forcing us to prioritize and choose between them.
It is through practical choices made in situations of value conflict that
we are likely to discover, articulate and actualize the kind of persons
we want to be.
Yet, the process of assessing and clarifying our values in
situations of value conflict may be difficult. Our deepest values are
often opaque; we may be motivated by underlying values that we don’t
explicitly recognize, but which can be seen over time to tie our choices
together in recognizable patterns. 166 Moreover, our process of value
clarification may be distorted by short-term and reactionary emotions
like anger, fear and insecurity. 167
Or, we may succumb to
rationalizations that sound like the articulation of our values, but
which are really just excuses for doing what we want to do it the
moment. Value clarification is a process of self-reflection—often
triggered by experiences of confrontation and choice—that helps
penetrate the fog of confusion that may attend practical choices in the
face of uncertainty. Its purpose is to help us surface and order our
values so that our lives will reflect our values, and we can become the
kind of persons we want to be. 168
When clients come to lawyers for legal advice and
representation, their legal issues are often entangled with values,
projects, commitments, and relationships with others. Sometimes
165
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legal tasks may touch on a client’s deeply held personal values, such
as getting legal help to start up a business a client has always dreamed
of having or helping a couple adopt a child. Sometimes legal action
arises because a client has been harmed by the actions of others: the
client has been fired from a job, hit by a car, or beaten by a spouse.
Sometimes the client has been accused of treating others unjustly:
sexually harassing an employee, reneging on a deal, negligently
allowing harm to others, or committing a crime. Other times clients
come to lawyers to overcome barriers to taking care of business as
usual: a deal needs to be negotiated, property needs to be leased, or a
permit needs to be obtained.
In discussions with clients, lawyers will inevitably emphasize
and order information in ways that influence the client’s choices. 169
Whether or not a lawyer discusses a client’s other commitments,
projects, relationships and values, the client still experiences the legal
interests within the context of these other considerations. The
counseling approach the lawyer employs will put a thumb on the scale
in favor of particular considerations. If the lawyer believes that her
role is to maximize the client’s legal interests, the lawyer will take an
approach that emphasizes legal interests over other considerations. By
contrast, lawyers who believe that their role is to shape representation
around a client’s values will give their clients space to clarify those
values and make representation decisions that are consistent with those
values.
As Luban pointed out, lawyers’ tendency to focus on their
clients’ legal interests may be justified to the extent that it diverts
clients from making impulsive decisions. If a client is experiencing
loss, transition or uncertainty about the future—such as in a divorce or
in the aftermath of a serious life-changing injury—the protection of
legal interests may be the most effective way to keep the client’s future
options open until she is able to adjust to dramatic changes in her life
and sort her values out. Where the threatened loss will severely impair
the client’s ability to pursue options in the future—as in criminal cases
where defendants face substantial loss of liberty or even death—there
may be particularly strong imperatives to protect the client’s legal
interests to keep avenues open for the client’s future ability to
actualize her values.
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However, legal interest-based counseling serves the
actualization of the client’s life goals only indirectly. Legal interests
are not good in themselves; they are merely the channels by which
clients can use the law to pursue and protect the things they value in
life. Protecting a client’s legal interests helps the client only because
interests are generalized means toward anyone’s ends. The temporary
restraint on impulsive decision making that legal interests provide is
valuable precisely because pursuing the wants of the moment may
foreclose the client from actualizing more deeply-held values, goals, or
life plans.
Counseling that proceeds on the assumption that client’s
merely want to maximize their legal interests is far from neutral. In
the context of legal representation—where the client may be
confronting new opportunities or battling fear, uncertainty, anger or
pain—counseling clients that they “should” do what is in their legal
interests to do may distort the client’s process of value clarification
and encourage self-seeking choices. 170 Lawyers who say “this is what
you should do”—when what they really mean is “this is what it is in
your legal interests to do”—may encourage clients to press their legal
interests further than the clients might otherwise be inclined to pursue
them. Clients who might otherwise be motivated to act in the public
interest may be dissuaded by their deference to a lawyer’s professional
expertise. Or, if a client is experiencing hurt or anger, knowing how
the law can be used to defeat the interests of others may provide the
client with a way to rationalize selfish choices at the expense of the
client’s better moral judgment. Just as lawyers may seek refuge in the
excuse, “but that is not my job”; clients may seek refuge in the excuse,
“but I’m just following legal advice.” 171
When a lawyer approaches legal representation as problemsolving endeavor shaped around the client’s values, it helps to mitigate
the distorting influence of legal interests and allow the client’s values
to provide a natural check on legal interest maximization. Like legal
interests, appeals to client values—to the kind of person that a client
wants to be—help curb impulsive, fearful or vengeful decisions.
However, rather than achieving this goal by appealing to a
hypothetical client’s standardized interests, client value clarification
appeals directly to the client’s own values. The purpose of value
clarification in legal counseling is not to change the weight or priority
of the client’s values—though that might be a byproduct of the
170
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process. The purpose is to ensure that the client’s representation
decisions are consistent with and further the client’s values.
The methods of client value clarification involve both actively
listening to what the client wants and probing beneath the client’s
expressed desires.
Client-centered interviewing literature, for
example, suggests that the lawyer dedicate time early in a client’s
initial interview for open-ended questions and other active listening
techniques that help the lawyer hear the client’s problem in the client’s
own terms. 172 Hearing the client’s story—as the client chooses to tell
it—is a key component of understanding what the client values and
what it is about the legal representation that will threaten or further
those values.
Client value clarification may also require probing beneath the
surface of a client’s stated desires. As Lehman has suggested, when
clients seek legal representation, their judgment and articulation of
what they really want may be skewed: “We say we want justice when
we want love. We say we were treated illegally when we were hurt.
We insist on our rights when we have been snubbed or cut. We want
money when we feel impotent.” 173 Lehman noted that instead of
inquiring about clients’ deeper goals, most lawyers give
instrumentalist advice on how to maximize outcomes based on a the
desires of a hypothetical “’standard client’ for whom lawyers are wont
to model their services.” 174 By contrast, lawyers interested in helping
a client center decisions on the client’s own values will help their
clients contemplate how the decisions of the moment will affect the
clients’ development in the direction of becoming the kind of person
each of them uniquely wants to be.
B.

Partisan Loyalty for Three-Dimensional Clients

The centering of legal representation on client values suggests
a more defensible ideal of partisanship than the “zeal at the margin”
for cardboard clients that has occupied legal ethical critique. As we
have seen, the moral theorists’ critiques of the standard conception
drew their force from their extreme interpretation of partisan loyalty as
“zeal at the margin” for clients who want nothing other than to
maximize their legal interests up to and beyond the moral limits in the
law. When this conception of partisanship is replaced with an ideal
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based on helping clients actualize their own values, the critiques lose
much of their force.
Hidden within the adversary system critique is a defense of
partisanship conceived more broadly as shaping legal representation
around a client’s actual values and fashioning advocacy around the
stories that clients would tell about themselves. For example, Luban’s
argument against the truth-finding efficacy of adversarial proceedings
was based on the observation that lawyers use a client’s legal interests
as a starting point from which to develop facts and present evidence to
a decision maker. The “theories of the case” that arise from this
method are misleading because they are based, not on the client’s
actual perspective of what occurred, but on what it would be best—
from the standpoint of the client’s legal interests—to prove. 175 Under
client-value centered partisanship, advocacy would be focused on
finding ways connect clients’ own stories to themes and values
reflected in the law. 176 Luban conceded that developing facts from the
actual perspectives of disputing clients (rather than from the standpoint
of their competing interests) would support, rather than hinder,
accurate truth-finding. 177 The same goes for the arguments from
human dignity and legal rights. The adversary system, Luban
conceded, could be defended quite strongly on grounds of human
dignity, 178 precisely because providing the opportunity for a client to
tell her own story is an important way of honoring her dignity.
In his later work, Luban has sketched just such an ideal of
partisan advocacy based on upholding a client’s dignity in which
lawyers strive to match the case theory the lawyer presents—the legal
story the lawyer tells about a client in negotiation or litigation—with
the cares, commitments, and concerns that are most central to the
client. 179 According to Luban, human dignity means “having a story
175
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of one’s own”—having a subjective view of the world in which one is
at the center. 180 Lawyers dignify their clients by giving voice to their
clients: by “telling the client’s story and interpreting the law from the
client’s viewpoint”; 181 and “by giving the client voice and sparing the
client the humiliation of being silenced and ignored.” 182 A lawyer
calibrating legal representation to a client’s values would be much less
likely to cynically manipulate the facts or stretch the law to extract
anything it could be made to give, and much more likely to look for
ways to legitimate the client’s values by connecting them to values
reflected in the law.
Client value-centered partisanship would also survive the role
disposition theorists’ critique. This critique, we can recall, is that the
standard conception encourages lawyers to develop a professional
disposition toward amorality, which dulls them to the harm they cause
others and is ultimately unsatisfying to lawyers themselves. However,
client value-centered partisanship would encourage the development
of a very different disposition: a disposition based in the capacities for
empathy and self-reflection. 183 To seriously undertake the task of
centering representation on client values, lawyers would endeavor to
see the world as their clients see it. Unlike the disposition of amoral
detachment, which is argued to be at the root of lawyer alienation and
discontent, 184 empathy with clients has been noted as a source of
internal motivation that can help sustain lawyers in their professional
roles. 185
In short, in the very places where “zeal at the margin” fails to
stand up to the deeper scrutiny of the early legal ethicists’ critiques,
client value-centered partisanship survives. The critiques of the moral
theorists are quite forceful when leveled against the extreme vision of
partisanship captured by “zeal at the margin.” Yet, if ideal
partisanship is conceived as being centered on client value
actualization, a more defensible—even honorable—version of partisan
loyalty emerges.
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C.

Moral Neutrality for Three-Dimensional Clients

In addition to critiquing partisan loyalty, the early legal
ethicists were critical of the moral neutrality of the lawyer-client
relationship. However, the critiques of moral neutrality—like the
critiques of partisan loyalty—were distorted by the assumption of
morally corrupt cardboard clients who cared only about maximizing
their wealth, freedom or power over others. Because the early legal
ethicists developed their ideal in a context defined by assumptions of
moral lawyers and cardboard clients, they had in mind clients who
were by definition devoid of moral constraint. And, the lawyers they
had in mind were by definition more suited to moral decision making
than the cardboard clients they had constructed. Focusing on client
value actualization requires a type of moral neutrality on the part of the
lawyer; because the lawyer focuses on the client’s values, the lawyer
must put her own values to the side. However, the moral neutrality of
client value-centered representation is not morally empty. Rather, it
imports moral considerations into legal representation by drawing on
the rich landscape of the client’s values—including the client’s moral
values—that might otherwise be excised by the lawyer’s focus on legal
interests.
Not all outcomes of value clarification favor morality.
Whether moral claims win out in the process of value clarification
depends on how important moral values are to the person doing the
clarifying. The process of value clarification will assist moral decision
making for persons who have internalized the moral values about the
way they ought to treat others. It may also assist persons who draw
support for moral behavior from personal values such as being an
upstanding citizen or good neighbor; in standing by their
commitments, honoring their word; or maintaining their reputation in a
community. But, helping to clarify the values of a person with largely
selfish values is likely to assist him in endorsing his own selfregarding behavior. The emotional core of Luban’s moral activism is
that standing by neutrally and allowing such a client to act on his
selfish choices would be tantamount to condoning his mistreatment of
others. Intervening to override the selfish choices of such a client
might violate his autonomy and dignity, but it may at the same time be
the only way to protect the autonomy and dignity of those who stand
in harm’s way.
The moral activist approach is defensible in the narrow
circumstances toward which it was originally directed: the situation of
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a moral lawyer counseling a cardboard client. However, the moral
activist solution is ill-suited to the representation of three-dimensional
clients because the tactics of moral activism run directly contrary to
the principles of respect for a client’s values. The moral activist
lawyer’s focus is on conforming the client’s behavior to the lawyer’s
conception of the public good. To achieve this end, moral activist
lawyers employ increasingly aggressive tactics of persuasion,
coercion, and even betrayal, which deliberately distort the client’s
decision making process. 186 The further along the scale the lawyer
goes, the more likely it is that the lawyer is battling the client’s deeplyheld values. Less deeply-grounded resistance is likely to give way
earlier in the process.
When lawyers and clients disagree about the morality of a
course of action, the problems with moral activist counseling take on
an added dimension. Like most people confronted with someone
reluctant to act in accordance with what we see as the claims of
morality, lawyers will have a tendency to believe that their clients are
mistaken in their moral calculus. We can affirm on an intellectual
level that our moral beliefs may reasonably differ from the moral
beliefs of others. However, when we are confronted with someone
who does not share our moral values, it is difficult for us to understand
their view as reasonable. We are more likely to believe that we are
right and that the other person has made a “moral mistake.” 187 The
belief that their clients are making a moral mistake will naturally tempt
lawyers to intervene into their clients’ decision making—perhaps even
by strong tactics—to prevent what they view as a moral wrong. The
stakes for the lawyer of gaining a client’s compliance with the claims
of morality—as the lawyer sees them—are especially high. Lawyers
do not simply sit by and tolerate their clients’ differing moral
viewpoints; they act on them. The force of the role disposition
theorists’ critique of the standard conception is that being forced to act
against their own values is damaging to lawyers.
186
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The kind of moral neutrality that results from respect for
another person’s values helps to discipline lawyers’ tendency to
impose their own moral and value choices on their clients in the guise
of legal advice. If we assume three-dimensional clients, it is respect
for client values that ensures the good that moral activism hopes to
achieve by importing moral considerations into legal representation
without succumbing to the danger of moral overreaching.
D.

Beyond Moral Lawyers: Three-Dimensional Lawyers in
the Arena of Legal Representation

If we take seriously the possibility that lawyers shape their
clients’ objectives in the direction of legal interest maximization, it
raises a puzzling question for moral theorists: why would lawyers
willingly create situations that provide them with deep role
dissatisfaction? Ethicists concluded that lawyers were forced into the
deeply dissatisfying kind of practice characterized by “zeal at the
margin” by their partisan loyalty to clients who insisted that the
lawyers pursue slash and burn tactics in the pursuit of immoral ends.
However, if we accept the premise that lawyers construct their clients’
objectives as legal interest maximization, we have to conclude that
lawyers who practice “zeal at the margin” are at least partially
responsible for their own misery. Part of the answer has to be that—
just as clients are not solely motivated by the maximization of their
legal interests—lawyers are not purely motivated by morality and a
commitment to the public interest. Lawyers, like clients, are morally
complex three-dimensional persons who bring a mix of reputational
interests, personal relationships, values, cares and commitments into
the arena of legal representation. And, all of these factors may affect
lawyers’ decision making for better or for worse.
An examination of the moral complexity of lawyers is
important for another reason as well. Even if we reject the moral
elitist premise that underlies the lawyer-statesman model—that
lawyers are morally superior to their clients—we might accept the
more plausible assumption that lawyers are generally better situated
than clients to make moral decisions in the specific arena of legal
representation. As we have seen, in the arena of legal representation,
clients’ own resolution of their conflicting wants, values and interests
may be distorted by temporary conditions of anger, fear or insecurity.
Because they are less personally and emotionally invested in the
situations that lead to legal representation, lawyers are arguably better
situated in legal representation to bring moral considerations to bear.
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However, to conclude that lawyers are better situated as moral
decision makers in the arena of legal representation, we need to
consider the ways in which lawyers’ own wants, interests and values
compete with their moral and professional judgment.
First, and most obviously, the lawyer-client relationship
involves a commercial exchange of services for fees, giving rise to an
interest on the part of the lawyer in maximizing the financial return on
a case. However the lawyer gets paid—by the billable hour,
contingent on the outcome, or on a flat fee or contract—the lawyer
will have a financial interest in the how the representation proceeds.
Hourly fees give the lawyer an interest in spending a lot of time on a
case, especially if the client is a “deep pocket” with virtually unlimited
resources to sink into legal representation. Consequently, a lawyer
billing by the hour may have a financial interest in making an
extravagant investment of time or resources in a task that produces
only marginally better results for the client. Contingent fees give
lawyers an interest in maximizing outcomes with as little investment
of time as possible, and at any cost to others along the way. Flat fees
or contracts give lawyers an interest in resolving the representation of
each client as quickly as possible, providing an incentive to conclude
or settle the matter whether or not the client has fully understood or
bought into the terms of the settlement or agreement.
Moreover, lawyers have a legal interest in protecting
themselves from malpractice lawsuits by advising clients to maximize
legal interests and leaving a clear paper trail anytime a client declines
to follow that advice. Lawyers who fail to pursue a client’s legal
interests as far as it is possible to pursue them risk exposure to
malpractice claims if the client suffers financial damage as a result of
the decision. Even if a client has made an informed and reasonable
decision not to pursue a possible avenue of relief, the lawyer may be
concerned about liability in the event of the client’s future change of
heart. The commonly recommended “CYA” letters that lawyers sent
to clients are designed to protect themselves against future malpractice
suits anytime a client decides to act against lawyer advice or the
clients’ own interests. 188
Lawyers also have reputational interests at stake in legal
representation. Lawyers may depend on their professional reputations
to make their practices run smoothly, and may be subject to informal
social sanctions for engaging in behavior that doesn’t serve the values
188
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or interests of other members of their professional community. 189 In
some cases, this pressure to conform to informal professional norms
can support ethical behavior. 190 However, it can also work as a
collective protectionist strategy to discriminate against lawyers who
represent outsiders or who are themselves outsiders to the legal
community. 191
In addition lawyers, like their clients, have personal values,
cares and commitments that come into play in legal representation.
Their personal identities may be defined in part by their ability to win,
their sense of fair play, or even their ruthlessness or gritty
determination. They may have ambitions for career advancement,
such as the desire to make partner in a firm or to get an appointment as
a judge. Preserving relationships inside and outside of professional
circles may be personally important to them. They may have political
commitments to practicing a certain kind of law or achieving a certain
vision of social justice through their legal careers. They may value
their families and the balance that they can achieve between work and
home life. They may be members of religious communities or
political organizations with accompanying values and commitments
that interact with or affect the actions they take as lawyers. Any or all
of these personal values and ambitions may affect lawyers’ decisions
in legal representation.
As critics have noted, the premise that lawyers are driven to
overly zealous tactics by the loyal pursuit of client interests does not
paint a particularly accurate picture of legal practice. 192 When
examined more closely, it appears that lawyers engage in “zeal at the
margin”—not because they are loyal to their clients—but because it
serves their own interests to do so. Lawyers practicing in small
communities are likely to curb the zeal of their advocacy to preserve
their professional relationships and standing in the community. 193
Lawyers for relatively powerless one-shot clients are more than
willing to manipulate their clients into taking deals that help maintain
the lawyer’s professional standing. 194
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Even in the place where the ruthless tactics of “zeal at the
margin” seem to be a more accurate description of lawyers’
practices—the large litigation firm—the lawyer’s own drive to
maximize profits by amassing billable hours provides at least as good
an explanation as the premise that these lawyers are acting out of
loyalty to their clients. At least, the assumption that big firm lawyers
are driven by their own financial interests may better explain how the
same lawyers who engage in scorched earth litigation tactics are also
willing to gouge their own clients with questionable billing
practices. 195
In the arena of legal representation, lawyers and clients are thus
differently situated, but it is difficult to conclude that one is better
positioned than the other to engage in moral reasoning and decision
making. The situations that lead clients to seek legal representation
may incline clients to pursue their wants in favor of their values.
Lawyers will generally have no particular investment in the situations
in which their clients are embroiled. However, lawyers will inevitably
have financial, reputational and personal interests that present their
own form temptation to transgress moral and professional values. The
principles of partisan loyalty and moral neutrality—redefined as
attention to and deference to client value choices—can help check
lawyers’ own self-interested motivations in legal representation.
E.

Spaulding v. Zimmerman in Three Dimensions

We are now in a position to return to Spaulding v.
Zimmerman—the legal ethics classic in which the lawyer for a
defendant in a personal injury automobile accident case chose not to
inform the plaintiff that he suffered a life-threatening heart
aneurysm—to explore the interests and motivations of the lawyer and
the client in three dimensions. As traditionally interpreted, Spaulding
presents a moral and ethical dilemma for the lawyer: should the lawyer
breach the professional duty of confidentiality to save a human life? 196
I have suggested that this interpretation of Spaulding has been driven
by a theoretical interest in creating conflicts between role morality and
ordinary morality, and that the more interesting ethical question raised
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by the real-life facts of Spaulding is why the lawyer felt entitled to
settle the case without consulting his client about whether to reveal the
potentially life-saving information.
I have argued that at the heart of the more interesting question
in Spaulding is the problem of legal objectification: the lawyer was
thinking only in terms of Zimmerman’s legal interests. Certainly, it
was contrary to Zimmerman’s legal interests to volunteer otherwise
confidential information that could increase the amount he owed in
damages. The defense expert who examined Spaulding opined that the
heart aneurysm could well have been caused by the automobile
accident at issue in the litigation. And, if the doctor was right, it might
well have affected the amount of money for which David Spaulding
was willing to settle the case. 197 However, this narrow view of what
was important to John Zimmerman overlooked his relationship with
David Spaulding and other values that might have influenced
Zimmerman to reveal the medical information to save the life of his
neighbor and friend.
Had the lawyer been following a client value-based approach
to legal representation, the situation would have been different. First,
the lawyer would not have received the information about David
Spaulding’s heart aneurysm in the vacuum of legal interests. Because
consistency with Zimmerman’s long-term goals and deeply-held
values would have been a central concern in the legal representation,
the lawyer would have spent time at the beginning of the
representation listening to John Zimmerman about hearing about the
context in which the lawsuit. When the information about Spaulding’s
heart aneurysm came across his desk, the lawyer would have been
attuned to the importance of the information, not just to the legal case,
but to Zimmerman’s relationship with the Spauldings family. And, he
would have flagged it as an important issue to discuss with his client.
In discussing with John Zimmerman the question of whether to
reveal the confidential information about David Spaulding’s medical
condition, the lawyer would explain to Zimmerman that he wasn’t
legally required to reveal the information and that revealing it might
drive up the costs of settlement—perhaps even over the limits of the
insurance policy. But the lawyer would also be prepared to help
Zimmerman put his legal interests into the context of his other values
and commitments. For example, the lawyer might probe to ensure that
197
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whatever decision Zimmerman made about divulging the information
was consistent with Zimmerman’s long-term values, perhaps asking
Zimmerman how he would feel looking back on the decision from
some vantage point in the future.
From what we know about the real Spaulding case, that kind of
discussion never took place. And, Spaulding provides a window into
the personal, financial and reputational interests that may have
prevented the discussion from occurring. Zimmerman’s lawyer was
hired and paid by the insurance company to represent Zimmerman,
and the insurance contract most likely gave the insurance company
rights to control the certain aspects of the defense. 198 Although these
contractual rights complicate the decision-making authority in the
legal representation, they do not alleviate the lawyer’s professional
responsibility to consult with his client about important representation
decisions, to share information that might create conflicting interests,
and to protect Zimmerman’s interests in the event of a conflict of
interest with the insurance company. 199
The lawyer’s own interest in future business with the insurance
company provided a powerful incentive for him to construe
Zimmerman’s objectives narrowly as legal interest maximization so
that a conflict would not materialize. Zimmerman was a one-shot
client that the lawyer was not likely to encounter again. The lawyer’s
long-term financial and reputational interests lay in protecting his
relationship with the insurance company that hired and paid him. 200 If
Zimmerman had insisted on revealing the confidential information, it
might have negated the possibility of a settlement within the policy
limits and created a financial conflict of interest between Zimmerman
and the insurance company. 201 Even if the settlement stayed within
the policy limits, Zimmerman’s insistence on revealing the
information might have created a conflict of interest requiring the
lawyer to withdraw. It was certainly easier for the lawyer to construe
John Zimmerman’s objectives narrowly in terms of legal interests
because when narrowly construed, Zimmerman’s legal interests
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remained in alignment with the legal interests of the insurance
company.
It was also possible that part of the reason for overlooking
Zimmerman’s broader interests in this case was that the lawyer simply
viewed the insurance company as the real party in interest and gave
little thought to John Zimmerman as a client. 202 Of course, that does
not answer the question of why the lawyer did not engage in a serious
value-based discussion about revealing confidential information with
representatives of the insurance company. 203 It is at least conceivable
that if consulted, representatives of the insurance company would
direct the lawyer to reveal the information. After all, David
Spaulding’s life hung in the balance, and that is a powerful counterweight to the profit motive of even the most calculating profitmaximizer. 204 Even absent the long-term relationship with Spaulding
that might have motivated Zimmerman to reveal the information, the
lawyer might have assumed—at least presumptively—that the
opportunity to save another human life was important to his insurance
company client as well.
Finally, it is conceivable that even after consultation
Zimmerman would have directed his lawyer not to reveal the
information. He might have decided that he just couldn’t do it to his
family: the accident had killed his brother and broken his father’s
neck, the family was struggling to hold things together, and he just
couldn’t inflict a devastating financial blow to his mother and
surviving family members. If so, the lawyer taking a client-value
based approach might have faced something like the dilemma
discussed by the early legal ethicists between whether to remain loyal
to the duties of confidentiality or to follow the moral imperative to
save a human life.
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But the lawyer’s dilemma at the conclusion of a client valuebased discussion would not be the same dilemma envisioned by the
early legal ethicists. The lawyer’s dilemma would not arise out of the
lawyer’s solitary struggle over whether to break out of the impersonal
demands of a professional role. Rather, the dilemma would arise in
the context of overriding the decision of a three-dimensional client
who had struggled through a difficult moral choice. Betraying another
person with whom you stand in a relationship of trust and protection is
qualitatively different than betraying a role obligation. And this
difference cannot help but affect the lens through which the lawyer
views his ordinary moral obligations. The lawyer who chooses to
override his client’s considered moral decision says, in essence: “You
may not be willing to bring more hardship upon your family to save
David Spaulding’s life, but I am going to do it anyway without your
permission and against your wishes.” When the early legal ethicists
talked about breaking out of bureaucratic professional roles to
acknowledge the human suffering of third parties, this kind of personal
betrayal was not what they had in mind. 205
Although it is difficult to say with any confidence what
outcome of a lawyer-client dialogue with either Spaulding or the
insurance company would have yielded, one thing is certain. A lawyer
who felt a professional duty to shape legal representation around the
client’s values as well as to protect the client’s legal interests would
not have been prevented by the logic of legal objectification—
buttressed by lawyer self-interest—that pre-empted the lawyer-client
dialogue in the Spaulding case from occurring.
IV.

BEYOND THREE-DIMENSIONAL CLIENTS IN LEGAL ETHICS

In the previous sections, I have argued that the problem of legal
objectification poses a more central and important moral and ethical
problem of legal professionalism than the conflicts between role
morality and professional morality on which legal ethics has
historically focused. And, I have argued that a client value-based
model of legal representation provides an antidote against both the
self-seeking behavior that legal objectification tends to promote and
the danger of moral overreaching associated with the lawyer-statesman
model. This Part examines representation in three contexts that
challenge the client value-based ideal of representation I have
proposed: the representation of clients with diminished capacity, the
representation of organizational clients, and cause lawyering.
205
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Each of the contexts examined in this Part poses a distinct
problem in defining and ascertaining client objectives—both generally
and in terms of client values. Implementing the methods of client
value-based legal representation is neither simple nor straightforward
in any of these contexts. However, I argue that a client value-based
approach to representation is still valuable as a professional ideal to
guide the behavior of lawyers. Each context provides reasons,
temptations and opportunities for lawyers to revert to either purely
legal interest-based representation or representation shaped around the
lawyer’s own values. A professional ideal that exhorts lawyers to
shape representation around client values—even when it is difficult to
implement directly—provides a valuable check on lawyers’ tendencies
to either legally objectify their clients or impose their own values on
the representation.
A.

Representing Clients with Diminished Capacity

When lawyers represent children, the elderly, or other clients
with diminished capacity, professional rules exhort them to “as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with
the client.” 206 However, this is not always easy to do. Elderly, child
or developmentally disabled clients often lack the capacity to direct
their lawyers. 207
The very process of determining how much
autonomy to allow such clients can result in “circular lawyer-centric
thinking” in which the lawyer abides by the client’s choices as long as
the lawyer agrees with them, and uses the client’s disagreement about
the client’s interests as evidence that the client lacks competency to
make an informed decision. 208
One possibility for a lawyer representing a client with
diminished capacity is to act as a de facto guardian, shaping
representation around what the lawyer determines to be in the client’s
best interests. 209 However, the de facto guardian model has been
criticized because it provides no constraints to check lawyer
overreaching based on bias or conflicts of interest. 210 The problem is
that what is “best” for a child, elderly, or other impaired client often
206
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rests on a value judgment. Allowing these judgments to be made on
the basis of the lawyer’s values runs the risk of imposing lawyer
values on clients whose own values diverge from that of the lawyer. It
thus exposes clients to decision-making based on the “the
personalities, values and opinions of the randomly chosen lawyers” in
their cases. 211
Another possibility is for the lawyer to determine an impaired
client’s objectives by reference to the client’s legal interests. 212 Legal
interests-based representation can help avoid the arbitrariness of “best
interest” representation by grounding representation decisions in
objectively determined legal rights. However, legal interests can also
be based on conflicting or substantively unfair law. 213 Moreover, as
with fully-functioning adult clients, the reduction of impaired clients to
their legal interests results in a narrow and individualistic
understanding of client objectives that overlooks significant non-legal
reasons why clients might choose not to aggressively pursue their legal
rights. 214 As scholars writing about the role of lawyers for children
have argued, the narrow focus of legal interests overlooks social
relationships that child clients may value and can isolate them from
caregivers and communities in which they form their strongest
psychological and emotional bonds. 215
The kind of client value-based approach to legal representation
proposed in Part III of this Article is difficult to implement directly in
the case of impaired clients. The methods of active listening and
probing to determine whether a decision is consistent with a client’s
deeply-held values may be difficult or impossible to carry out with
clients who are impaired in their “ability to understand, deliberate
upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own
well-being.” 216 For example, elderly clients may not always be lucid,
or their decisions may reflect distorted priorities. 217 Very young
children may be unable to express their preferences, and even children
211
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who can express their opinions often lack the maturity and competence
to direct their lawyers in complex decision making. 218
However, when invoked as a professional ideal rather than as a
methodology, client value-based representation provides a goal toward
which lawyers can strive. For example, comments to Model Rule 1.14
on diminished capacity clients suggest that lawyers can check “the
consistency of a [client’s] decision with the known long-term
commitments and values of the client.” 219 With elderly clients,
lawyers are encouraged to gather information about the client’s longterm commitments and values by consulting family members who
have “known and perhaps lived with the client for years.” 220 With
children, the situation is different, because children have “not yet
reached the point in life when their values have been revealed.” 221
However, lawyers can view client competency as a “dimmer switch”
that always allows access to some amount of information about the
client’s unique individuality, and to stay true to the interests and
wishes of child clients to whatever degree the child’s individuality can
be expressed. 222
B.

Representing Organizational Clients

Like most of legal ethics, the analysis of legal ethics for threedimensional clients is based on a paradigm of individual client
representation. The question arises how a lawyering model based on
individual client representation can translate to situations where the
client is an organization, rather than a natural person. More
particularly, the question arises whether a client-value based model
makes any sense at all in the context of organizational clients. After
all, it is natural persons who have hopes, dreams, fears, loyalties,
commitments and values that fill out the dimensions of their objectives
beyond simple legal interest maximization.
The individual client model is used as a metaphor for the
representation of organizational clients.
Ethically, lawyers for
organizations are required to treat the organization itself—a fictitious
entity—as the client. 223 This means that the fictitious entity-client is
supposed to decide the objectives of the representation and engage in
218
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the consultation required about how those objectives are to be
pursued. 224 However, neither ethical standards nor lawyer training
provide direction on how a lawyer is to go about ascertaining the
objectives of a fictitious entity “embodied in a large and diffuse
collection of people and information.” 225 Lawyers are directed
generally to defer to the decision-making of duly-authorized
constituents of the organization—usually officers and directors—on
matters involving policy, operations, and the assessment of risk. 226
And, most of the ethical heat in organizational client representation is
generated by situations in which the actions of individual constituents,
like managers, expose the organization to substantial injury as a result
of a legal violation. 227 In such situations, lawyers are directed to
protect the best interests of the organization.
It could be argued that the easiest way for lawyers to separate
the interests of the organizational client from the self-interest of
managers and other constituents is to revert to simple legal interest
analysis. The objectives of organizations, it might be argued, really
are nothing more than the sum of their legal and financial interests.
Hence, the problem of legal objectification that plagues the world of
individual client representation creates significantly less concern in the
organizational client context. In the organizational context, legal
objectification helps lawyers accomplish what is best for the
organization—as opposed to individual constituents—by ensuring that
legal representation decisions protect and promote the organization’s
best interests.
However, the argument that organizational clients are nothing
more than the sum of their legal interests is both too facile and
somewhat suspect. It is too facile because organizations may well
have objectives beyond the crude maximization of their freedom,
wealth and power over others. Organizations are complex entities
with reputations, organizational cultures, relationships with outsiders,
and ties with the community that create interests beyond the
maximization of their profits. 228 The argument is also suspect because
it too easily conflates the objectives of organizational clients with the
profit motive of the lawyers who represent them. Lawyers whose
224
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financial success depends on billable hours have self-interested
reasons to pursue every conceivable legal argument at their client’s
expense. 229 Lawyers’ legal objectification of organizational clients
may thus provide a convenient rationalization for the pursuit of the
lawyer’s own interests under the guise of zealous representation of
client interests.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the lawyer-statesman
model is the most promising ideal for guiding lawyers’ professional
role in the organizational client representation context. Responsible
corporate decision-making that takes the organization’s broader
interests into account requires a range of viewpoints from both insiders
who are assimilated into corporate culture and outsiders who can
challenge it. 230 Within this mix of views, lawyers can play the role of
the corporate conscience, questioning whether and how the proposed
actions of the organization comport with the public interest. 231 And,
the more intrusive methods of moral activist counseling do not present
the same dangers of moral overreaching when lawyers operate as one
voice among many in the organizational decision-making process.232
However, the lawyer-statesman model poses its own problems of
implementation in the corporate context. Although strong moral
counseling seems more appropriate in settings where the client is a
relatively powerful corporate entity, the lawyer is likely to be less
comfortable raising moral considerations as part of legal representation
in such contexts. 233 And, even in the corporate context some of
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lawyers’ concerns with explicitly moral dialogue arise from skepticism
that their “own view of morality” is not universally shared. 234
The methods of client value-based representation present an
alternative for lawyers representing organizational clients that lies
somewhere between the crude assumptions of legal interest
maximization and the moralistic approach of the lawyer-statesman
model. As we have seen in the individual representation context, part
of the purpose of client value clarification is to curb impulsive client
decision-making that may be distorted by anger, fear or insecurity and
to ensure that legal representation furthers the clients’ deeper and more
fundamental values. 235 Lawyers in the corporate context can serve a
similar function of checking the sometimes unrealistic optimism that
tends to pervade business and corporate culture by raising measured
and risk-averse concerns about the long-term consequences of
proposed decisions. 236 And, they can help promote and invite their
organizational clients’ voluntary compliance with legal regulation by
being spokespersons with corporate management about the purposes
and functions of legal regulations. 237
Such inquiries invite the constituents with decision-making
authority in an organization to consider the long-term goals and values
of the organization and to consider how the goals and values of the
organization fit within the structure of legal regulations that govern
corporate activity. And empirical analysis of the attitudes and reported
behavior of corporate lawyers suggests that they often engage in some
of the same counseling techniques designed in the individual client
context to probe the consistency of a client’s decision with the client’s
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deeper values. 238 For example, researchers in one study concluded
that when counseling their business clients, lawyers tend to couch
moral considerations in pragmatic or reputational concerns, such as
asking a client what a proposed course of action would look like on the
front page of the newspaper, or how it would be viewed by a judge or
the jury. 239 Such appeals to reputation are not simply part of a
pragmatic cost-benefit analysis or strategy for making the lawyer’s
moral judgment of the client more palatable. Rather, as Mark
Suchman points out, “[t]he ‘newspaper test’ operates much like
Mead’s ‘generalized other’—providing a social looking-glass that
allows one . . . to see and judge oneself.” 240
C.

Cause Lawyering

Finally, the representation of politically vulnerable, socially
disadvantaged and otherwise disempowered clients presents both a
special case of the tension between legal interests-based representation
and the dangers of moral overreaching associated with the lawyerstatesman ideal and unique challenges to a client value-based
representation as a solution.
In one view, the representation of politically and socially
disempowered client presents the most appropriate venue for a client
value-based approach to legal representation. Because of their relative
lack of legal sophistication, such clients are seen as particularly
vulnerable to domination by their lawyers. 241
Moreover, the
construction of client objectives in purely legal terms in the poverty
law context is especially pernicious because it reinforces inequities
built into the law itself. Because those without social advantage lack
the power to influence the law-making process, the law that affects
their lives is often created without taking their perspectives into
account. A client value-based approach to legal representation holds
out the promise of making law more responsive to the lived experience
238
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of clients by shaping legal representation around the values and
narratives of clients. 242
However, the conditions of poverty law practice pressure
poverty lawyers in the direction of legal interest-based representation.
The overwhelming need for legal services and the relentless demands
to meet the immediate and often desperate needs of individual clients
create pressures to process cases routinely and to settle them as
quickly as possible. 243 To access the remedies that law offers
politically vulnerable or socially disadvantaged clients, lawyers must
slot them into categories that may be disconnected from the
perspectives and circumstances of their lives. 244 And, this pressure
works against the ability of lawyers to use individual client
representation to change the contours of the law. The incentive for
more powerful repeat players like landlords, employers and banks is to
settle cases that might make unfavorable law, while the incentives for
one-shot individual clients are to maximize their tangible gain in the
particular case by taking the deals they are offered. 245
Moreover, the typical client value-based methods of
overcoming legal interest-based representation through active listening
and probing for client values are arguably insufficient to overcome the
barriers created by social subordination. Even when poverty lawyers
attempt to attend more holistically to the values of fewer individual
clients—such as in law school clinic settings—the individual focus of
representation in discrete cases has a tendency to isolate the client’s
objectives from the collective and community values required for
reform of unjust laws and systems. 246 And, clients who seek legal
services are often in crisis situations of eviction from housing, denial
of benefits for life necessities, loss of parental rights, or deportation.
Attention to the unique needs of such individual clients will often be
synonymous with getting whatever remedy the law offers to alleviate
the crisis.
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To escape the endless grind of remedying injustice one client at
a time, lawyers for politically and socially disadvantaged clients have
engaged in what Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat call “cause
lawyering.” 247 In cause lawyering, the representation of individual
clients is a means to the achievement of political ends that transcend
the individual clients’ financial or legal interests. 248 Cause lawyers
choose or recruit clients to fit the needs of the cause and put the needs
of the cause over the needs of the individual clients who represent the
class for whom the lawyers advocate. 249 Although the needs of
individuals are subordinated to collective goals, the promise of cause
lawyering is to effect reforms that will improve conditions for entire
classes of persons affected by injustice embedded in the law itself. 250
Cause lawyers are arguably an embodiment of the lawyerstatesman ideal. 251 The relative independence from client control and
the ability to define and pursue public interest goals directly are
consonant with the ideal of the lawyer who mediates between the
client’s interests and the public good. As Scheingold and Sarat put it,
cause lawyers are “advocates not only, or primarily, for their clients
but for causes and, one might say, for their own beliefs.” 252
However, the dangers of moral overreaching associated with
the lawyer-statesman ideal also assert themselves in the context of
cause lawyering. Perhaps the quintessential example of cause
lawyering is the NAACP’s campaign to desegregate public schools. 253
This campaign involved both a carefully-orchestrated legal challenge
that resulted in the historic 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of
Education, 254 and a persistent decades-long effort to enforce and
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implement Brown through litigation in lower federal courts. 255
However, as Derrick Bell argued in one of the earliest critiques of
Civil Rights lawyering, the lawyers’ pursuit of the goal of
desegregated schools became disconnected from the goal of better
quality education that desegregation was designed to achieve. 256
Committed to the symbolic importance of desegregation, beholden to
their middle-class donors, and disconnected from the experience of
inner-city black families, national-level NAACP lawyers opposed
local efforts by community groups and parents to structure settlements
that would retain segregated school systems and require the investment
of resources to improve the quality of inner-city schools. 257
As in the context of representing clients with diminished
capacity and representing organizational clients, a client value-based
model of representation presents itself not so much as a method of
representing individual clients, but as an professional ideal or “theory
of practice” around which lawyers representing socially and politically
disadvantaged clients strive to shape their representation. 258 The
strategies of a new generation of lawyers practicing law for socially
and politically disadvantaged clients seek greater participation from
clients in the formation of collective goals, while at the same time
recognizing that the clients’ capacity for voicing collective values may
have to be consciously created, rather than merely received. 259 Lucie
White, for example, recounts ways to create space in the “margins” of
a lawsuit for class members to discover and define a collective voice
through speak-out events or street theater. 260 Lawyers have also
formed alliances with community organizing groups, often playing a
subordinate role in the definition of the legal services that would
benefit the larger social movement. 261 These strategies seek to avoid
the disengagement from client values that may result when the
lawyer—a socially advantaged social and political actor—defines the
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“public interest” in isolation from the values and perspectives of the
clients. 262
CONCLUSION
The debates in theoretical legal ethics center around the way
lawyers’ roles should be conceived, and they both arise from and help
define the way lawyers practice law. The early legal ethicists sought a
definition of lawyers’ professional “role morality” that would serve the
theoretical purpose of generating conflicts between role morality and
ordinary morality. But in starting from the standpoint of theory, I have
argued, they misinterpreted practice. The lawyer behavior that looked
to them like the overindulgence of client interests, I have argued, was
really something else. It was really the lawyers’ own legal
objectification of their clients: the narrow construction of client
objectives in terms of legal interests and the disengagement from client
values. As a result of misdiagnosing the problems that plagued legal
professionalism, legal ethicists proposed a solution—the “lawyerstatesman” model—that aggravates the problem of lawyer
disengagement from client values by encouraging lawyers to shape
legal representation around the lawyer’s conception of morality and
the public interest.
The client value-based approach to representation that this
Article proposes asserts a faith in client values as a corrective for both
the anti-social aspects of legal interest maximization and the hubris of
the lawyer-statesman ideal. Attention to client values may not, in the
end, provide salvation from the competitive and self-interested culture
of American society. But if competition and self-interest are culturally
pervasive, reliance on lawyers to transcend by appealing to their own
personal values is just as idealistic a dream. The goal of shaping
representation around the values of clients provides an opportunity for
legal representation to redeem itself without compromising the core
values of client loyalty and service that lie at the heart of legal
professionalism. Before we give up on the professional values of
client loyalty and service, we ought to see what it would be like if
lawyers actually represented their clients, rather than zealously
pursued their clients’ legal interests.
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